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This dissertation attempts to look into the aspects of the involvement of the private
sector in the ownership, development, management and operation of ports in
Tanzania. The purpose is to have a critical analysis of the transformation of the
Tanzania Harbours Authority from service to landlord status and to evaluate its
economic and social impacts.  As a starting point, an evaluation of the existing
situation in THA has been done. This exercise has revealed critical problems and
constraints that have, in one way or another, contributed towards the inefficiency and
poor performance of ports. On the other face of the coin, the problems and
constraints seem to suggest that public sector dominance in commercial undertakings
has failed to steer economic development hence the need to open up doors for more
private sector involvement in the provision of port and related services.
Privatisation of ports is a relatively new approach to port management in most
developing economies including Tanzania. Some of the countries, which have
adopted this approach, have recorded successes including improved performance and
efficiency, which outweigh the associated impacts. Admittedly however there is no
privatisation menu that is applicable to every port. It is the local conditions that
determine what privatisation option is liable to provide more benefits with less
adverse impacts. With this in mind, various concepts related to privatisation are
discussed in order to have a full understanding of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different reform methods practised by various ports in the world. These are
applied to the Tanzania environment in an attempt to determine the most suitable
option compatible to the local situation. Whatever the privatisation method adopted
both private and public sector will continue to have significant roles to play in the
provision of port and related services.
Key words: Commercialisation, privatisation, Competition, Technology, Investment,
Efficiency.
Abstract
Title of the dissertation: Restructuring the Port Industry in Tanzania
Privatisation of the Tanzania Harbours Authority.
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1CHAPTER ONE
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Ports in Tanzania are operated as state undertakings and are subjected to the
problems and constraints common to public owned enterprises. The problems and
constraints include lack of market orientation, scarcity of investments due to
monetary policies and budgetary procedures, inefficiency, the sheltering of
employment and the imposition of social obligations through political interference.
In 1993, the Tanzania government decided to undertake major reforms in the
management of the economy.  The economic reforms were taken in view of
continued poor performance of the public sector. The reforms were mainly directed
at:
(a) Limiting government role in running development and commercial
undertakings;
(b) Resource mobilisation drive;
(c) Active private sector involvement in the development undertakings.
To facilitate private sector involvement, the government decided to undertake
restructuring measures on public owned organisations and creating a free market
economy based on competition. The fundamental thrust of the privatisation
programme is to increase the efficiency of the economy, reduce government
budgetary costs, broaden direct ownership of productive assets, and reduce and
2reorient the role of government to concentrate on the provision of social and
economic infrastructure.
1.2 Definition of the Problem
The Tanzania Harbours Authority is one of the public owned institutions which the
government has already initiated some restructuring actions. The process of the
privatisation of THA is based on four policy decisions made by the government:
(a) Declaration of THA as specified corporation under the public corporations
act of 1993, amendments of 1994 which gave the PSRC powers and
responsibilities for its restructuring;
(b) Ownership of THA to remain with the government at 100% share;
(c) Commercial activities be privatised;
(d) THA be transformed into a Landlord Port Authority.
Implementation of the above policy decisions commenced with the commissioning
of a World Bank financed THA Commercialisation Study in 1996 followed by the
PSRC initiated study known as “Tanzania Port Privatisation Review in 1997”. Based
on the recommendations of the two studies, THA adopted the approach of creating
standalone terminals for privatisation under the “Autonomous Strategic Business
Units” concept. The Strategic Business Units, which were identified, are:
(a) Container Terminal;
(b) General Cargo Terminal;
(c) Bulk Liquid Terminal;
(d) Grain Terminal;
(e) Coastal Terminal;
(f) Marine Services;
(g) Tanga and Mtwara Ports.
3Assessment of viability for privatisation of each business unit is based under the
following main criteria:
(a) Operational criteria
This entails assessing the BU potential to operate as an independent
cost/profit centre, market orientation and whether it is a core business of the
authority;
(b) Financial consideration - Does the BU make positive or negative
contribution to THA;
(c) Additional investment requirements;
(d) Impact on employment;
(e) Integration with other business units (strategic implications);
(f) Attractiveness to private investors including markets considerations and
price.
1.3 Significance of the Problem
The transformation of THA from public to more private sector participation involves
a critical analysis and evaluation of the organisation’s institutional framework and its
operating environment. The institutional framework influences the degree of
autonomy enjoyed by THA as well as its business culture and decision making
process. The operational environment is currently not very favourable because of
increasing competition from other ports in the region, which has resulted in loss of
the market share. On the other hand, the organisation has been facing fund raising
problems for investments and to acquire appropriate technology particularly in
equipment and IT sector. These are some of the impediments that make THA to be
less responsive to market demands and the solution lies in increased private sector
participation. Partnership between the public and private sector is the only way that
would ensure a balance between national interests and economic development on the
one hand, and investors’ interests and commercial operation on the other
4There are a number of different forms of introducing private sector participation in
ports. While each has its own characteristics, the involvement of the private sector in
each case calls for some explicit regulatory arrangement. In any case continuing
public participation forms part of the broader regulatory framework and may carry
the risk of short-term political priorities and other non-commercial criteria, which
would undermine efficient enterprise performance.
The commercialisation/privatisation measures being undertaken are focused on
making major changes within THA in terms of organisation and structure as well as
its culture. The organisation is to change from the current high degree of
centralisation to decentralisation of operations. THA has adopted and commenced
implementation of major recommendations by setting up business centres based on
cost or profit. The cost centres are service oriented business units without their own
income. The objective is to achieve a high cost transparency to provide THA
management with the appropriate information to justify and manage the costs. The
profit centres are market oriented business units with their own income whose
objective is to achieve a high transparency to provide THA management with the
appropriate tools to manage costs and revenue.
Privatization of the commercial activities of THA is directed at:
(a) Improving the efficiency of port operations;
(b) Enhancing the quality of services;
(c) Improving the competitiveness of the Tanzania ports vis-à-vis other
regional Ports.
THA had completed by 1996, the formalities for the privatisation of its commercial
services.  The process is currently on going and is being implemented in stages.  The
container terminal has been nominated the first candidate for privatisation,
tentatively by May 1999. The time frame for the rest of the business units is end of
the year 2000.
51.4 Objectives and Scope of the Dissertation
The objectives of this study are:
(a) To examine the essence of privatisation of the Tanzania Harbours
Authority;
(b) To assess the privatisation options adopted by THA;
(c) To assess progress in the privatisation process;
(d) To examine and evaluate the economic and social impacts of privatisation;
(e) To make proposals and recommendations regarding the future role of THA
after the privatisation of its commercial activities.
1.5 Study Methodology
The study involved literature search of the published and unpublished materials
relating to the management of ports. This included an analytical review of THA
performance in terms of its operations, financial, capital investments and human
resources development.
Contact with the THA, Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC)
and Ministry of Communications and Transport to collect information on the current
situation and future policies on restructuring of THA were made. An analysis of the
privatisation options was made and aligned with the mission and the objectives of
privatisation. Further literature search and analysis was undertaken to examine how
other port authorities did implement the privatisation process, including
transformation to landlord status. Lastly, information on local and employee’s
participation in the privatisation process was also sought. Visiting experts’ views in
the field of ports and commercialisation/privatisation of ports at WMU have been
analysed and incorporated where appropriate.
61.6 Limitations of the Study
This paper was being prepared at a time when the privatisation process for THA has
just commenced. So far not a single business unit has its privatisation concluded. The
container terminal which has been designated the first candidate of privatisation, is
still in the initial stages towards a lease arrangement. The study has not benefited
from the initial privatisation experience. Due to time and fund constraints, it was not
possible to collect and evaluate primary data and information related to the study
thus limiting the scope of study materials to secondary data and information which
was also not easily available.
Summary
The dissertation comprises of six chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the
study by highlighting on the subject under discussion, its objectives and how it has
been covered. Chapter two gives a background of the port industry in Tanzania
including its mission. It also looks into the ports’ past performance and identifies the
problems and constraints surrounding it. Chapter three discusses the public sector in
Tanzania and the need for enhanced private participation. Various port reform
methods are discussed in chapter four and their application to the Tanzania
environment is covered in chapter five. The study concludes by giving some
recommendations on various aspects related to the private sector participation in the
ownership, operation, development and management of ports in Tanzania.
7CHAPTER TWO
2. Tanzania Harbours Authority as an Operating Port Authority
2.1 Institutional Set Up and Mission
2.1.1 Introduction
The Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA) herein referred to as the authority, was
established by the Act of Parliament No.12 of 1977. The organisation came into
existence by assuming the functions of the then East African Harbours Corporation
(EAHC) and the East African Cargo Handling Services (EACHS) which ceased
operations following the collapse of the East African Community (EAC). The
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania owns THA 100%.
According to the Act, THA is charged with the following major functions:
(a) to establish and operate a co-ordinated system of harbours;
(b) to provide facilities relating to harbours and provide harbour services and
services ancillary thereto;
(c) To develop, improve, maintain, operate and regulate harbours.  In
summary, THA is a public corporation which has been given the
responsibility to own, operate, manage and maintain all Tanzania’s sea
ports.
82.1.2 Organisational Structure
The business and affairs of the organisation is vested under the Board of Directors.
The board is responsible for setting the policy, reviewing the objectives, assessing
management’s performance and directing strategies for performance improvements.
The CEO is the Director General, responsible for the proper and efficient conduct of
the business and activities of the authority. The Director General is assisted by two
assistants who head the Technical Services Division and the Finance and
Administration Division. The Technical Division is made up of the departments of
Engineering and Technical Services, Operations, Supplies and Marketing while that
of Finance and Administration is comprised of departments of Finance, Management
Services, Manpower Development and Administration, and Corporate Planning. A
director heads each of the departments. By virtual of more activity at the Dar es
Salaam port, the Port manager is at the equivalent level to that of Assistant Director
General and is assisted by three Assistant Port Managers in the areas of operations,
finance and administration, and technical. The structure at the ports is a replica of
that at the head office. The organisation structure of THA is top heavy. The decision-
making machinery is centralised at the head office.  Although many of the activities
are performed at the ports, the Port Managers do not have much authority to make
important decisions concerning their ports. Decisions concerning issues such as
investments, budgets and use of funds, hire of labour and personnel placements,
training etc are the prerogative of the Head Office.
The existing THA Organisation Structure is shown in Figure No. 1.
9THA Organisation Structure
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Some Aspects of the Existing Organisation Structure
The two posts of Assistant Director General were created in 1990 following a review
and implementation of the scheme of service. This move created one more ladder
between the chief executive and heads of the functional departments. But the two
posts were never filled up when they fell vacant in 1994. The size of the organisation
in terms of the number of functional departments has also been expanding over time.
The creation of the departments of Management Services and that of Marketing in
1990 are some of the noticeable examples in this regard. These moves have resulted
in the organisation to be “top heavy” and bureaucratic. The effectiveness of the new
structure is not clearly evident as yet.  As a matter of fact a critical evaluation of the
current structure reveals some aspects of bureaucracy, overlapping of functions and
duplication of duties by the various functionaries in the organisation.
The extended levels of delegated authority translates to an overwhelming number of
people in the decision making process. Management is concentrated at the head
office. At the port of Dar es Salaam there are three Assistant Port Managers
responsible for Port Operations, Technical and Finance and Administration. The port
at the same time maintains the positions of Terminal Managers and heads of
functional departments such as Finance, Supplies, Manpower etc. One can question
the effectiveness of this kind of delegation of authority because the same services are
also found at the head office located a stone throw away. In such a situation, it is not
suprising to find elements of duplication of work and overlapping of duties. This
leads to increased costs and inefficiency. Therefore it is in the interest of THA to
have a pro-active and flexible management that is capable of providing quick
response to customer demands and which will also direct changes in line with
changing port and market environment. Certainly several functions can be combined
with a view to having a streamlined organisation structure that provides for efficient,
cost effective and authoritative decision making at all levels.
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2.1.3 Corporate Mission.
The corporate mission of THA is “To be the gateway for the Eastern, Central and
Southern Africa international trade totally dedicated to providing and facilitating
quality, value added, competitive and profitable port and maritime services using
state of the art technology and highly motivated workforce”.  In line with this
mission THA is committed to providing port services to meet the present and future
needs of its customers through optimal use of the physical, financial and human
resources.  Towards this long-term goal and in recognition of the strategic location of
the port of Dar es Salaam for serving the landlocked countries’ international trade,
beginning 1985, THA initiated major developments, which resulted in:
(a) Expansion of the port capacity for both general cargo and container traffic
to enable the port of Dar es Salaam to handle increased volumes of traffic at
any time;
(b) Modernisation of the port through the acquisition of modern cargo handling
equipment and facilities for enhancing port performance, productivity and
efficiency;
(c) Training of staff to equip them with modern cargo handling techniques to
enable them to be more efficient cost effective and achieves higher
productivity;
(d) Introduction of flexibility in the management of the tariff, customer care
and inculcate commercial/business culture and be more market oriented.
2.2 Physical Performance Review.
2.2.1 THA Ports
THA owns and operates three major ports namely Dar es Salaam, Tanga and
Mtwara. Dar es Salaam is THA’s principal port with rated capacity to handle 10.1
million tons of general cargo, containerised cargo, dry bulk and liquid bulk cargo per
12
annum. The port handles more than 90% of Tanzania’s international trade and is also
an important gateway for the landlocked countries of Zambia, Malawi, and Republic
of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Tanga port is the second in size with a
rated capacity to handle 500,000 tons of general cargo per annum. The port is
strategic for the agricultural rich North Eastern parts of Tanzania where Coffee and
Sisal are the major export commodities. Mtwara port has a rated capacity to handle
400,000 tons of general cargo. The port is an important link for the southern regions
where surface transport is very acute. The port is renown for its exports of cassava
and Cashew nuts.  Besides the three major ports THA is also responsible for the
small ports which include Kilwa, Lindi and Mafia. Figure No. 2 shows the
geographical location of the three major ports under THA.
2.2.2 Performance Review
Physical performance review for THA explains how the authority has fared in terms
of cargo throughput, shipping traffic and productivity. The review provides details on
the amount of cargo handled by the authority and the number of deep-sea ships that
called at THA ports for the last five years. It also shows the rate at which particular
types of cargo and ships were handled indicating the level of utilisation of the
resources and facilities as indicated by berth occupancy, gang output, container
moves, ship turnaround time and cargo dwell times. The performance indicators are
compared with the rated capacity to determine the level of utilisation of the ports’
facilities, rate of standard performance, and trend analysis to determine the behaviour
of a particular indicator as to whether it is increasing or decreasing over time.
Comparison with the set targets is also made to measure management’s effectiveness
in supervision, managing the resources, understanding of the external and internal
environment of the organisation.
13
Figure No. 2
Geographical Location of THA Ports
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2.2.3 Cargo Throughput
Cargo traffic through THA ports is generally a function of the economy countries
using the ports and also the performance of the inland transport system and the extent
at which it can effectively compete with other regional ports. Adverse weather
conditions and the on going civil disturbances have affected the economies in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.  Thus cargo throughput for
THA for the last five years has been in the range of 4 million tons to 5.2 million tons
per annum. This is less than 50% utilization of the rated capacity of the ports. The
trend in the throughput has not been good too. As can be seen from table no 2 below,
the general trend shows decreasing cargo throughput. Regarding the decreasing trend
in transit traffic, besides poor economic performance of the individual countries, the
other major contributing factor is competition among the ports in the region, which
has intensified, in recent years. The opening up of the Nacala and Beira corridors in
Mozambique which were non operational due to the civil and also that of Durban in
South Africa following the collapse of apartheid have contributed to the diversion of
traffic from THA ports. In this regard THA has lost a sizeable share of the Central
African market to Mozambican and South African ports. Notably here is Zambian
copper which THA ports used to handle more than 80% during the 1980s but now is
handling only about 50% of the Copper exports. There has been a fall in Zambian
copper production from 422,000 tons in 1990 to 328,000 tons in 1997. Further losses
of Zambian traffic are likely. This will affect the amount of transit traffic for THA
since Zambia has traditionally been the most important user of the port of Dar es
Salaam among the transit countries. Traffic from the democratic republic of Congo
has fallen partly due to the collapse of the country's copper industry. Malawi traffic
also is disappearing very fast from the port of Dar es Salaam and has mainly been
diverted to Nacala and Beira after the end of the civil war in Mozambique.  Efforts to
capture some of the Uganda traffic from Mombassa port in Kenya are yet to bear any
fruits. As for Burundi, traffic has mainly been affected by the sanctions imposed on it
to which Tanzania has implemented with zeal.  One could also point out here that
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inadequate and poor services of the inland transport system that connect Dar Es
salaam port with the hinterland is a major constraint for an effective competitive
stance of the port.
Total traffic has also been declining as a result of the stiff competition from other
ports in the region. These include Mombassa in Kenya, the strongest competitor for
traffic from Uganda and Rwanda, The ports of Beira and Nacala which are main
alternative ports for traffic from Malawi and Zambia, and the port of Durban and
East London in South Africa for Zambian cargoes.  The prospects of improvements
are not particularly bright at least as far as the traditional routes and types of cargo
are concerned. To improve its competitive standing THA must strive to improve the
level of service that it offers to its two main customer groups, that is shipping lines
and shippers.
Table No. 1 shows trend in total cargo traffic handled during three last five years.
Table No 1.
Total Cargo Throughput – DWT
(000,000)
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
Imports 3.84 3.24 3.47 3.14 3.05 3.36
Exports 1.29 1.10 1.17 1.00 0.88 0.86
Total 5.13 4.34 4.58 4.14 3.93 4.22
Transit 2.16 1.76 2.16 1.39 1.32 1.18
Break Bulk 2.83 2.43 2.58 2.03 1.73 1.88
Dry bulk 0.17 0.21
Liquid Bulk 2.30 1.91 2.00 2.11 2.03 2.13
Source: THA Annual reports.
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2.2.4 Shipping Traffic
Shipping traffic also did not record any significant improvements. Dry cargo ships
shows a decreasing trend from a pick of 649 ships in 1993/94 to a low of 604 ship
calls in 1996/97 as can be Seen from Table No. 2 below. However, ship calls for
tankers have been increasing from 100 ships in 1992/93 to 126 ships in 1995/96, an
increase of 26%.
Table No. 2
Shipping Traffic
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
Dry cargo Ships
(No.)
622 649 646 640 604
Average stay in port
(Days)
4.6 5.9 5.1 5.5 4.0
Tankers
 (No.)
100 102 115 126 120
Average stay in port
(Days)
3.3 4.6 3.0 3.5 4.0
Source: THA annual Reports.
2.2.5 Productivity
Port productivity is influenced or affected by a number of factors. The major factors
include:
(a) Type of cargo being handled;
(b) The number of people employed in a gang;
(c) Mechanical equipment being used, type of ship being worked;
(d)  Stowage of cargo in the holds and storage area conditions.
2.2.5.1   Gang Productivity
For THA, the most important productivity indicators are the gang output for general
cargo and containerised cargo, ship turnaround time and cargo dwell times. The
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general cargo gang performance is currently at the average of 130 tons per gang per
shift compared to the target of 170 tons per gang per shift.
At the container terminal, the average performance currently stands at between 12
moves per hour to 16 moves per hour. Just like in the general cargo productivity, it is
very low compared to the target of 20 moves per hour. There is however signs of
improvements as the workers get used to the new technologies. Productivity for the
last 5 years has been very low as shown in Table No. 3 below.
Table No. 3
Trends in Port Productivity 1992/93 –1996/97
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
General cargo
Tons/gang/shift
124 143 129 116 126
Container Traffic
Moves /hour
12.3 13.30 15.2 14.2 15.8
Berth occupancy
Container
61 48 51 45 55
Berth occupancy
General cargo
60 64 55 60 55
Dwell time container -
days
13 18 27 22 36
Source: THA Annual Reports
The reasons for not attaining higher productivity are:
(a) There has not been enough investment in equipment and facilities at both
the container and general cargo terminals. There is particularly very low
availability of yard tractors and trailers. Major equipment is functioning
satisfactorily, however, the ability to get cargo /containers to and from the
SSGs is affected by the relatively low availability of backup equipment
such as yard tractors trailers and front loaders;
(b) The labour force is not motivated enough for them to put more efforts and
value the ports’ customers hence there is lack of punctuality, lost time
between shifts, absenteeism and lack of discipline among the workers;
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(c) Other problems, which affect productivity, include, cumbersome operating
procedures, poor supervision, poor planning of the operations, lack of
computerised control system and absence of a good radio communication
system.
The above problems have greatly affected the productivity in THA such that the set
targets are never realised and the levels are far below regional and international
productivity averages as indicated in Table No. 4
Table No 4
Comparative Productivity Levels – Container Terminal Dar es Salaam
Productivity factor THA Actual
Performance
THA
Target
Mombasa
Port
Durban International
Recommende
d
Berth occupancy 55 % 50 % 65 % 50% 50 %
Dwell times 36 days 7 days 15 days 3 days 3 days
Moves per SSG/hour 12 20 10 22 25
Lifts per Ship hour 13 20 13 25 25
Source: THA Annual Reports and Port Statistics Mombasa
2.2.5.2 Berth Occupancy
The percentage of berth occupancy is directly related to the productivity of loading
and unloading of vessels.  Improvements in productivity will reduce berth
occupancy. As a rule, occupancies in the 55% -65% indicate a requirement to
consider planning for berth extensions. Serious queuing generally starts to appear as
occupancies move above this level. However, increased efficiency in terminal
operations should cut down berth occupancy. (See Table No. 5).
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Table No. 5
Percentage of Berth Space Occupied in One Year – Container Terminal
1996/97
Berth Percentage
vacant
Occupancy
not working
Occupancy
working
Occupancy
not
workable
Total %
occupancy
9 40.39 9.61 50.00 0.00 59.61
10 37.04 11.02 51.94 0.00 62.96
11 56.92 9.64 33.44 0.00 43.08
All berths 44.78 10.09 45.13 0.00 55.22
Source: Study for the Concession of the Container Terminal – CPCS Transcom, 1997
2.2.5.3 Containers Dwell Times
Container dwell times at the container terminal Dar es Salaam port is very high up to
37 days as can be observed from Table No. 6. Excessive dwell times have immediate
impact on productivity.  The cargo occupies valuable space in the active operational
areas thus creating congestion and additional handling.  It also interferes with the
productivity of other essential activities. Excessive dwell time is also a very serious
problem as it reduces the terminals throughput capacity in some cases preventing the
operator from offering services to other potential customers.
Table No.6
Average Container Dwell Times in Days 1995-1998
Container type 1995 1996 1997 1998
Imports 36 31 37 36
Exports 5 3 10 8
Empties 32 13 8 10
Average 25 18 22 22
Source: THA Annual Reports
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The high dwell times are an illustration of the inadequate capacity and highly
inefficient inland transport system, which connect the ports and their hinterlands.
Both rail and road transport is in poor state and is critically in need of major
maintenance. Cumbersome and long customs procedures, which are a common
feature in Tanzania also, contribute very much to the high dwell times.
2.3 Financial Performance Review
Since its inception, the financial performance of the THA has been satisfactory.
Over the last five years, beginning 1992/93 the Authority's revenue increased
steadily from Tshs. 28,089.61 million to Tsh. 44,058.96 million. This is an increase
of 56.85% over the five-year period. On the other hand, expenditure during the said
period increased sharply from Tshs. 21,683.24 million to Tshs. 38,676.30 million,
which is an increase of over 78%. The high increase in expenditure was a result of
three major policy decisions that were taken during the period under review.  Firstly,
the authority decided to increase the salaries paid to its staff by 65% in 1994 and
again in1997 as a measure towards improving take home amount for the workers.
Prior to this move the salaries of the workers were generally very low. Increase in
salary was also expected to boost their morale and hence increase productivity.
Secondly, the Authority also decided to reduce the number of its workforce gradually
effective 1995 through voluntary retirements and later on retrenchment. Handsome
payments for voluntary retirement and retrenchment were effected in 1995 and 1996
respectively. Thirdly, the authority had in 1992 decided to undertake a revaluation of
its assets. Thus in 1993 the land and marine based assets were re-valued.  This
exercise resulted in the increase of depreciation expenses by about 46%. The
financial performance of THA for the last five years is presented in Table No.7.
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Table No 7
Financial Performance: Financial year 1993- 1997
(In million T. Shs)
Fy1993 Fy1994 Fy1995 Fy1996 Fy1997
Operating Revenue 28,089 37,886 42,068 49,106 44,059
Operating  Expenditure 21,683 29,910 41,683 41,992 38,676
Operating Surplus 6,406 7,976 385 7,114 5,383
Non operating Revenue 2,025 1,806 3,101 4,359 2,212
Non operating Exp. 3,797 277
Surplus (loss) before tax 3,880 4,571 (311) 11,196 7,524
Gross fixed assets 56,542 60,088 61,989 64,385 72,289
Investment 949 764 3,895 5,379
Net Current assets 11,529 18,829 25,654 26,289 26,148
Loans 26,060 36,583 46,953 46,855 49,571
Average revenue/ton 5,507.77 8,810.69 9,185.19 11,719 11,210.94
Average cost/ton 4251.61 6,955.82 9,101 10,022 9,841.22
Profit (loss)/ton 1,256.15 1,854.88 84.11 1,698 1,914.50
Return on Capital Employed 8.65% 11.5% 4.8% 9% 9%
Profit margin 13.8% 12.1% 27% 24%
Operating
Expenses/Revenue
87.1% 88.5% 98.0% 85.5% 87.8%
Return on net fixed assets 6.86% 7.6% 17.38% 10.40%
Debt equity ratio 0.61 0.85 1.12 1.05 1.00
Debt coverage ratio 2.61 2.16 1.87 1.79 1.97
Source: THA Annual Reports and Accounts.
NB. 1 US $ = 650 T. Shs in 1997
Profitability
Three ratios are used to measure the profitability of the Authority. In terms of profit
margin, this has been fluctuating but generally increased from 13.8% in 1992/93 to
17.1% during 1996/97. The return on capital also increased from 8.6% to 11.5%in
1993/94 and settling at 95 during 1996/97.
Debt equity ratio has been rising from 0.61 to 1.0 signifying that the Authority has
increased its borrowing rate in recent years. However, the Authority was still
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operating within the limits set by the World Bank which has put the debt equity ratio
not to exceed 1.5 i.e. 60:40.  In any case the increased borrowing was necessary for
the Authority to finance the modernisation and expansion of the ports of Dar es
Salaam and Tanga.
In terms of liquidity, THA is one of a few public organizations in Tanzania with very
good liquidity standing. This is important for a big organization like THA to have the
ability to finance her short-term obligations as well as having adequate funds for day
today operations. This has enabled the Authority to escape any financial
embarrassments, which could disrupt the operations activities. Of unique importance
also is the authorities ability of having adequate funds for payment of salaries to the
labour force since delayed payment of salary in a port industry can spark off the
labour to loose their morale, go for a go slow and ultimately go on strike.
2.4 Development Programme
In order to cope with the trends in international shipping and trade, and in response
to market demands for better services, THA, beginning 1985 embarked on a major
investment programme for the ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. The purpose of the
investment programme was to rehabilitate the existing port facilities and equipment
and to modernise them. Investment in infrastructure, equipment and technology was
necessary to cope with the changes in maritime shipping and to withstand
competition. The major thrust has been on providing facilities to handle the
increasing volume of containerised cargo. The development program for the port of
Dar es Salaam is being implemented in phases. During phase 1, which was carried
out in 1985-1990, the container terminal came into place by conversion of existing
general cargo berths 9, 10 and 11 and further investments in the provision of
container handling equipment. Other investments were in rehabilitation of general
cargo berths 1-8 plus cargo handling equipment, construction of the grain terminal,
rehabilitation and upgrading of the Kurasini Oil Jetty for handling of white products,
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and technical assistance and training. Phase 2 commenced in 1990 up to 1994
providing investments towards extension of container stacking yards at the terminal
and ICDs, upgrading of the KOJ, repairs to piles and fenders for berths 9, 10 and 11,
and purchase of additional cargo handling equipment for the general cargo and
container terminals.
After successful completion of phase 2 in 1994, THA continued with investments
under phase 3, which is still on going. Under this phase, the Dar es Salaam Port
Entrance Channel Improvements project was implemented and completed in 1997.
Completion of this project has a major impact towards improvements of the port
productivity and overall port performance, as it will allow night navigation and
bigger ships to call the port. However the improvements of the Entrance Channel are
not sufficient to enable the port to handle bigger ships beyond the 2nd generation. The
port is still constrained in equipment, adequate water depth at the berths and
navigational channel hence it cannot cope with the demands of the ever-increasing
size of container ships as can be observed from Appendix 2.
The authority continued to improve the equipment position by purchasing more
cargo handling equipment through a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB)
in 1997. Unfortunately however, the project on the Replacement of the Single Buoy
Mooring Pipeline used for handling of crude oil for the refinery in Dar es Salaam and
Ndola, Zambia could not be implemented due to non-availability of funds. The
World Bank, which has been co-ordinating, the Dar es Salaam port project is not in
favour of this project urging THA and Tanzania in general to liberalise the oil trade
and adopt a regional approach to investments and use of facilities.  Co-ordinated
development of port and port related infrastructure projects of common interest
within the region is desirable in order to improve the level of efficiency, quality of
service and cost effectiveness. For the oil industry, the bank urges that it would be
cheaper and economical for Tanzania and other countries in the region, to source oil
from South Africa than to operate her own refinery.
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During this period, the port of Tanga also received facelift with investments from
ODA. Works carried included rehabilitation of quay No. 1, provision of 17, 000
square meters of container stacking areas and strengthening of operational
maintenance and management capacity
2.5 Human Resources Development
Upon its establishment in 1977, THA inherited over 10,000 employees from the
defunct East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC) and the East African cargo
handling Services LTD (EACHS). It was obvious at this time that there were more
workers in permanent employment than was needed. However, there were some
shortcomings in respect to adequate management skills, supervisory skills and the
level of education and experience of the workforce in general. Thus, the authority
had to institute new policy directives that limited fresh employment, gradual
reduction in the number of workers but at the same time focusing on adequate
training for workers. Beginning 1990, the authority embarked on a passive adaptation
approach on the labor force. Gradually the number of workers started to decrease
through natural attrition, as fresh employment was restricted to skills and aptitudes
not available in THA. By December 1992, the number of employees has decreased to
7,962 from 9,572 in 1990.  However, this strategy was not producing faster results.
Therefore, the authority had to resort to compulsory retirement by way of
retrenchment of the excess staff to achieve an establishment of 5,321 employees. The
retrenchment exercise started first with voluntary retirement, in December 1995
involving 1,034 workers. Compulsory job cuts followed in January 1996 for all
stations and further staff retrenchments carried out in June and August 1997 for the
ports of Tanga and Mtwara respectively claiming 2,826 workers. Thus, the total
number of staff who has lost jobs so far is 3,860. Further staff reductions are planned
to take place this year at the port of Dar es Salaam and at the head office. Table No.
8 shows trend in number of employees since 1990. Other ports too have experienced
similar trends as exhibited in Appendix No. 6.
25
Table No. 8
Staff Disposition 1990-1997
StationYear
HQ DSM Tanga Mtwara
Total
January 1990 570 7,084 1,537 381 9,572
December 1990 544 5,975 1,246 349 8,114
December 1991 542 5,962 1,238 349 8,091
December 1992 525 5,871 1,219 347 7,962
December 1993 492 5,766 1,203 346 7,834
December 1994 482 5,340 909 327 7,058
December 1995 453 3,554 836 292 5,135
June 1996 439 3,348 834 248 4,869
June 1997 421 2,927 553 153 4,054
Source: THA Annual Reports and Accounts 1990-1997.
2.6 Problems and Constraints
2.6.1 Corporate Culture
The success of any organisation, commercial or otherwise and THA is no exception,
is solely dependent on the willingness of the organisation’s staff at all levels to work
with commitment.  A corporate culture which creates attitudes dedicated to the
service to ones customers in a timely and cost efficient manner is essential for
success.  For THA however, employees’ commitment and corporate culture is
missing. The SLI report on the Dar Es salaam port development study 1994-2004,of
October 1993, volume 3 port operations and terminal management reported on page
1-2 that:
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“The consulting team met many individuals within the THA who were highly
committed to the organisation, but the THA culture, influenced by its history
as a parastatal, does not seem to allow theses individuals to strongly
influence the current operations. Individual managers in the port do not
stress efficiency and cost effectiveness of their particular departments.
Similarly, they do not feel responsible for resolving problems as they arise,
nor are they held accountable for managing their respective departments in a
manner which will provide a high standard of reliable services. The port
labour force on the other hand has a low morale and is characterised by
absenteeism, tardiness and low productivity”.
It is important therefore that management standards be improved by giving line
managers authority to establish and enforce operating policy and procedures and be
taught the basic principals of customer service to allow the port to provide a high
standard of cost efficient services. On the labour force the organisation should
implement policy towards reducing and casualizing the labour force.
2.6.2 Competition
Of recent, competition between ports in Eastern and Southern Africa has increased
and is increasingly becoming more severe. This has happened because now the port
users i.e. shipping lines and shippers are now able to choose between ports since
there are many ports serving the same hinterland. The major competitors to THA
ports include Mombassa port in Kenya for the traffic to and from Uganda, Rwanda
and to a less extent traffic for Burundi and DRC. The ports in Mozambique
particularly Beira and Nacala are competing with Dar es Salaam for Zambia and
Malawi traffic. This has become even more evident with the return to peace in
Mozambique followed by the rehabilitation of the railway links, which were
devastated by the civil war. Both Malawi and Zambia have relatively better rail and
road connections to the ports than to Dar es Salaam port. The other major competitor
is the port of Durban in South Africa, which seems to be getting a better deal due to
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better inland transport links with Zambia, Malawi and DRC. Also relatively lower
ocean freight rates compared to that of Dar Es salaam port works in favour of the
port of Durban. An increased trading activity between South Africa with East and
Central African countries has also contributed to increased competition within the
region. On the other hand, competition between THA ports has been very rare
probably because of the diverse differences in capacity but also because they serve
different hinterlands and the institutional set up under THA, which discouraged
competition. Hinterland connections for the ports along the Eastern and Southern
Africa ports are shown in Figure No. 3
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Figure No. 3
Hinterland Connections for Eastern and Southern Africa Ports.
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2.6.3 Inadequate Capacity and Inefficiency of the Inland Transport System
The hinterland of the port of Dar es Salaam is accessible by both rail and road
transport systems. However, both rail and roads are insufficient in terms of capacity
i.e. the amount of goods they are able to move in a given period. The two railways,
TAZARA and TRC do not have enough rolling stock and pulling power hence the
low volume of goods they can carry. TRC lines are old and thus subjected to frequent
breakdowns and accidents. The standard for most of the roads is very poor and is in
urgent need of repair. The inefficiency of the land transport is a major contributing
factor in increased cargo dwell times, which go beyond 30 days in some cases. It is
therefore important to improve co-operation with customers and other service
providers in the transport market. Initiatives taken by THA of working together with
other service providers to improve customer services cost effectiveness and
efficiency under the Transport Co-ordination Committee (TCC) need to be sustained.
2.6.4 Poor Growth
For some time now THA has witnessed a continued stagnation in traffic a situation,
which has led to poor market growth. The hinterland of the port has for some time
also not been generating sufficient traffic due mostly to its poor economic
performance, which has in turn, resulted to decreased overseas trade. Still, even the
little traffic that is generated is distributed through many competing ports now
serving transit traffic. Further decline in traffic may lead to the port of Dar es Salaam
being gradually relegated to feeder port. This should not be allowed to happen taking
into consideration of the massive investment already made in the port. It is high time
that THA adopted effective marketing strategies by defining the market and develops
leadership operationally as well as strategically in the market.
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2.6.5 Poor Productivity
As already mentioned earlier on, THA ports are characterised by poor productivity
and inefficiency. Productivity levels have always been below target set by
management, do not compare favourably with those of other ports in the region, and
are below word averages. There are no signs for improved productivity and
efficiency in THA in the near future. Low productivity is a constraint to the port
competitiveness and for maintenance of market share. It is vital for THA ports to
improve their productivity and efficiency levels even more in order to keep or regain
market shares. Improvements need to be made in several aspects relating to
management, supervision and employee attitudes.
Some aspects of the ports’ inefficiencies and poor productivity are a result of the
cumbersome and long customs procedures, and poor services of other port related
service providers such as shipping agencies, freight forwarders, transport providers
etc. Of great concern too is the inadequate provision and use of Information
Technology including Management Information System (MIS). THA is lagging
behind in the use of modern information technology such as computers to facilitate
its operations activities thus the management of information including availability
and dissemination is quite a problem and leaves a lot to be desired. On a more
positive note however, the UNCTAD sponsored project on “Advanced Cargo
Information System” which is in the process of being installed at Dar es Salaam port
is expected to improve the information management in THA.  It will also provide
links to shipping as well as to land transport system. THA should continue to develop
information systems and integrate them with shipping, shippers and other customers
with he sole purpose of improving the flow of information and responses in all
directions.
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2.6.6 Over Employment
Another feature, which is worth noting in THA, is the number of workers it needs.
Several studies done in THA have mentioned the aspect of over employment. THA
has long recognised this problem and had initiated and actually started to implement
measures towards reducing the labour force to required levels. After having
undergone downsizing through natural attrition and also retrenchments, it would
seem that the optimum number of employees required is yet to be reached hence
further reductions in the number of staff are still imperative. Reductions in the
number of staff will also assist in the aspect of checking the increasing trend in
operational costs. After staff reductions, THA has to take measures aimed at
broadening competence to improve utilisation of resources by instituting labour
reforms that involve the entire organisation from management down to the ordinary
workers.
2.6.7 Decision Making
Last but not least is the issue of bureaucracy and decision making both within THA
and on issues requiring government approval. As per current practice, THA budgets
entailing revenue and expenditure, training, capital development program need the
approval of the government. So is the tariff review. Besides the government, the
other supreme decision making body is the Board of Directors whose Chairman is
appointed by the President while the members are appointed by the minister
responsible for transport. The board meets at least six times in a year to deliberate on
various issues of the authority. Almost every thing in THA has to get the blessing of
the Board of Directors. The decision making process of the government and that of
the board take a long time thus there is always a time lag and delay in effecting some
of the important decisions. An example of this delay in decision making is with
respect to the two positions of the Assistant Director Generals, which have remained
vacant since 1994 to date. Probably there was no need to have these posts filled up
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that is why the board has paid little attention on the matter. It would be of help to the
organization if some of the responsibilities were decentralized.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter explained in some detail on how the Tanzania Harbours Authority is
organized as owner of infrastructure, superstructure and provider of all port services
and labour in accordance with the act of parliament, which established the
organization in 1997. Over the years THA has been struggling to provide the port
customers the needed range of services quite satisfactorily. However, the changed
shipping, port and market environment poses serious challenges to the organization,
which have to be addressed to ensure its existence.  The major problems, which THA
is facing, are associated with its institutional framework, poor inland infrastructure
facilities, changing business environment associated with increasing competition
from neighbouring ports and poor corporate culture. The consequences of the above
problems have manifested in decreased traffic volumes and market share, and low
productivity.  The solution to this is for an institutional reform and reorganization of
the maritime sector in Tanzania.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. Restructuring of The Public Sector in Tanzania
3.1 Background
Public owned organisations in Tanzania are a direct consequence of the country’s
policy of socialism and self-reliance, which was adopted in 1967.  Under this policy
it was declared that all major means of production should be under public ownership
and that individuals are not allowed to accumulate wealth while the majority are
living in poverty. Consequently Tanzania decided to nationalise all privately owned
property, which was adjudged to, is of prime importance in the production process
and equitable distribution of wealth at least in the context of Tanzania.  Property,
which was nationalised, included all land, big industries and trading companies,
estates, banks, transportation companies etc.
Upon nationalisation, the government established State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to
run and manage the nationalised companies. The government extended its arm in the
management of the public owned companies by appointing chairmen and members
of the board of directors and top management. Often also the government was called
upon to intervene and assist companies by injecting more working capital and
provision of subsidies.  State monopolies emerged and dominated the production and
exchange of goods and services in the country. Until the early 1990’s, 90% of the
Tanzania economy was being run and controlled by the public sector. Thus for over
30 years the Tanzanians worked hard in support of state owned enterprises with high
expectations. However, the anticipated achievements for faster economic
development were not forthcoming. Instead the country’s economy continued to
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weaken but the government not realising the problem went on injecting more and
more resources to the ailing parastatals with a view to revive them to no avail.
Provision of subsidies and working capital could not improve effectiveness of state
owned companies, as there was no incentive for the state monopolies to operate
efficiently.
The problem most state enterprises centred on a weak capital base, weak
management, operational inefficiencies, government interference and bureaucracy.
This associated with their non-responsiveness to consumer demands turned out to
be too much of a burden on the consumer and the taxpayer. The consumers could
not get the goods and services they wanted and at reasonable price.  The taxpayer
was being forced to finance loss making and inefficient public companies.  Worst
of all the country’s resources were being used inefficiently and the economy was
suffering. Inflation kept on rising and the standards of living were worsening.  The
goal of achieving economic development under the banner of socialism became a
distant dream.  Now it has become apparent clear that the economic management in
the country needed to be overhauled. As the President of the United Republic of
Tanzania Mr Benjamin Mkapa, during a speech when opening the Tanzania
ambassadors’ conference on 19th April 1999 put it:
“By the early 1980s Tanzania had a very large public sector covering a wide
spectrum of national life. But it was a public sector that did not create a surplus to
sustain itself in terms of new technology, new knowledge and new machinery, let
alone to finance sustainment of the countrywide network of economic and social
infrastructure. If the public sector could not deliver, we had to try the private
sector”.
In Tanzania and in many other parts of the developing economies, a change to
market economy was being spearheaded by the World Bank under the various
“Structural Adjustment Programmes” introduced since the early 1980s. Under the
programme, the economy gained modest achievements hence the government
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embarked on the “Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)” in 1986. The ERP was
initially aimed at paving the road for economic recovery by laying a firm ground for
sustained long-term development. Among the major objectives of the programme
was to accelerate and broaden the reform process which was introduced in the
economy under the “Structural Adjustment Programme” supported by the Word bank
and IMF financing packages. Major aspects of the programme are liberalisation and
deregulation of a hitherto closely controlled economy, transfer of the leading role in
economic development from the public to the private sector, and achieving macro
economic stability.
Thus in 1992, Parliament passed the Public Corporations Act, and its amendments in
1993 opening up doors for private sector participation in the economic development
of the country. Further development in this regard was in the establishment of the
Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1993 under the Public
Corporations Act (amendments) and given the following powers:
(a) To specify corporations for restructuring;
(b) To execute detailed plans for the restructuring of specified corporations.
3.2 Restructuring and Privatisation
Before discussing the objectives of the restructuring programme in Tanzania, it is
important to highlight the underlying concepts in as far as they apply to the transport
sector in the country. Restructuring is defined (SMAK Kaombwe, ARC 1998) as:
“The composite of all actively taken organisational changes aimed at
transforming the relationships within the enterprise, and between it and its
environment, in order to give it a new focus, character, scope, goals and
purpose for existing.”
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The main thrust for the restructuring programme is to introduce changes in an
enterprise concerned so as to make it to provide services in a more competitive,
efficient and cost effective manner by changing the way it is owned, controlled and
operated. Restructuring encompasses such changes as management structure, mission
(strategic orientation), capital structure, legal form and size and composition of the
workforce etc.
As far as Tanzania is concerned, restructuring of the dominant public sector means
embracing more of private sector participation in economic activities more so in
running commercial activities through commercialisation and privatisation.
Commercialisation will bring about the condition of economic viability for the
enterprise by requiring it to operate as a profit making commercial undertaking
without depending on government subvention.  Privatisation on the other hand aims
at effective participation of the private sector achieved by transferring full or partial
transfer of the development responsibilities, facilities and operating functions
(ownership, management and operating functions) from the public enterprises to
private sector developers, operators and service organisations. The main motivation
in privatisation is improved efficiency and effectiveness and greater economic
growth realised by enhanced competition as market forces in the production and
exchange of goods and services come into play.
3.3 Objectives of the Restructuring Programme.
The public sector in Tanzania has been dominating the economy for over 3 decades.
It has been explained that the public sector could no longer deliver the goods and
services. It could no longer pioneer the economic development of the country. And
given the governments limited capability to finance economic development, it was
more than logical for taking restructuring measures in the management of the
economy. At corporate level, however, the restructuring measures are not only
tailored to improving the operations and financial performance but the individual
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firms are to have the required institutional framework, financial, human resources
and technological resources that will enable it to be competitive, improve service
offering, attract foreign investment and technology.
In undertaking the restructuring programme, detailed objectives have been
formulated. These have been discussed at various levels for smooth implementation.
In summary the objectives of privatisation, which the government is pursuing, are:
(a) To improve the operational efficiency of public enterprises and their
contribution to the economy;
(b) To reduce the burden of loss making public enterprises on the government
budget;
(c) To expand the role of private sector in the economy permitting the
government to concentrate public resources on its role of provider of basic
public services such as education, health;
(d) To create conditions for economy to operate governed by market forces;
(e) To stimulate and encourage local participation in the ownership and
management of business;
(f) To promote the development of capital markets;
(g) To secure enhanced access to foreign investments, technology and markets.
Within the port industry the actions to be undertaken during the implementation of
restructuring programme are:
(a) Encourage economic liberalisation of port operations through ;
• institutional restructuring of the state owned port operations,
• Reducing the role of the government in port operations,
• Limiting government subsidisation of port operations.
(b) Enhance competition in port operations by encouraging efficient port land
use and wide spread and diverse participation in the provision and
management of port infrastructure and commercial activities in or in
relation to ports;
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(c) Secure public interest by strengthening the capacity of the government to
promote;
• port safety and protect the safety of lives , property and navigation;
• competition between ports and within ports and between services
providers,
• retaining public ownership of port land and port waters,
• Protecting the environment.
(d) Facilitate regional development and co-operation by encouraging the
complementary operation of the regional ports as hub and feeder ports and
sea ports hinterland optimisation.
The objectives of the reform programme are better summarised by the President of
the United Republic of Tanzania Mr. Benjamin Mkapa, who, speaking to the
members of the conference of Tanzania Financial Institutions on December 1, 1995
said:
“We recognise that the government has no business on the eve of the 21st
century to be in business. The gradual withdrawal of government from
production and commercial activities will continue and the private sector will
be supported to enable it take over the activities. By withdrawing from direct
production activities, the government will have more resources with which to
strengthen essential social services, economic infrastructure; human capital
development and performance of the traditional roles of state in particular
the maintenance of law and order. The reform of the public sector will
continue to be a key element in our economic policies. The objectives of these
reform include to improve efficiency, increase capacity utilisation, offer new
employment opportunities, enhance production, bring in new skills, and
technology, open up foreign markets for our products, increase government
revenue through taxes and dividends and generally cut public losses inquired
through the parastatal sector. But it is also our goal to promote the widest
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possible, and transparent, participation by our people in the ownership and
management of the restructured economic activities of the state”.
3.4 Parastatal Reform Programme and the Role of the Presidential
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC).
3.4.1 Establishment of the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform
Commission (PSRC).
3.4.1.1 Establishment and Functions
The public corporations act of 1992 was amended in 1993 to provide for the
institutional framework for privatisation. It also facilitated the establishment of the
Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC). The PSRC is an
autonomous organ of the government, which is charged with the task of managing
the privatisation process in the country. The specific tasks of the PSRC are:
(a) To prepare and maintain an up to date list of SOEs and strategies for
privatisation of specified corporations;
(b) Formulate and execute detailed plans for the restructuring of specified
corporations;
(c) Supervise, monitor and enforce the restructuring procedures and
agreements;
(d) Make recommendations on which corporations to be specified.
3.4.1.2 Divestiture Alternatives
The divestiture alternatives under consideration by the PSRC in parastatal reform
are:
(a) Sale of all or most shares to joint venture partners;
(b) Sale of assets;
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(c) Assets lease;
(d) Performance contract for some companies while they remain in the public
sector;
(e) Liquidation for firms with no prospects or have unmanageable debts;
(f) Transfer to the Loan and advances realisation Trust;
(g) Commercialisation- given full autonomy and required to operate on
commercial principals;
(h) Restructuring e.g. to perform regulatory functions.
3.4.2 Progress in the Implementation of the Reform Programme
It is now sixth years since the establishment of the PSRC and commencement of the
privatisation process. Over 68 per cent of all our public enterprises have been
privatised, or handed over to the Loans and Advances Realisation Trust (LART). Of
the 395 public enterprises that were lined up for divestiture through the PSRC, 132
were divested through sales agreements of which 57 were industries and other
commercial entities, 35 were in agriculture, 16 in natural resources and tourism, and
24 in other sectors.
A further 145 enterprises are at different stages of privatisation. In this group are
large public utilities, infrastructure enterprises, as well as financial institutions
including the Tanzania harbours Authority (THA). The privatisation of public
utilities, financial institutions, and infrastructure enterprises have to be done much
more carefully in view of their sensitivity, size, complexity of operations, as well as
their critical importance to the rest of the economy and the welfare of the people. In
addition, attitudes have to be changed gradually from the socialist mind-set against
privatisation of public utilities, banks and financial institutions, and the perceived
cost-free availability of some of the services they offered. Studies have to be made,
and consultancy services provided, in determining the best options for privatisation,
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and in putting in place the requisite regulatory framework, which did not exist
before, for private sector participation.
Progress in divestiture of SOEs is presented in Appendix 3.
3.4.3 Problems Being Encountered in the Privatisation Process
3.4.3.1 PSRC Tenure
The tenure of office for the PSRC and the time frame set for privatisation programme
is 5 years commencing in 1993. It was anticipated that most of the work of parastatal
reform would have been concluded within the set period. By 1998, however, the time
set has expired and there stills remained more work to be done. Major utility
companies such as power, telecommunications, ports, water were still in the initial
stages of privatisation. The government was however still considering request for
extension of tenure for the PSRC.  The slow pace of privatisation can be attributed to
bureaucratic decisions by the government on either policy issues or approval of
divestiture strategies of particular parastatals.
3.4.3.2 Privatisation Programme Time Plan
The privatisation programme in Tanzania is behind schedule and its pace declined
substantially especially in 1996. It should be noted that the time limit has expired at a
time when the commission has just embarked on the privatisation of utilities, which
are more complex and sensitive. Occasional delays in concluding the divestiture of
some public enterprises has led to asset stripping and siphoning of cash by the
employees who are uncertain of their future employment.
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3.4.3.3 Shortage of Funding and Manpower
Shortage of financial and other resources such as qualified and experienced
manpower to deal with the diversified areas of public enterprises within the given
period. PSRC has therefore been depending on external finance and expertise
(Consultancy) for carrying out studies and payment for retrenchment of employees.
3.4.3.4 Buyers Financial Constraints
Another constraint is the low financial capability of some of the buyers, especially
indigenous Tanzanians.  Thus although the government would have wished to divest
public interests in our enterprises to Tanzanians, it has not been possible due to the
fact that few have the capacity in terms of capital, skills, technology, and knowledge
of markets to be able to buy and rehabilitate the enterprises to the level of being
competitive in a global economy. The Capital market is yet to take shape. The slow
evolution of a viable capital market mechanism has made mobilisation of investment
funds locally extremely difficult thus slowing down the process of privatisation.
3.4.3.5 Labour Implications
The initial phase has resulted in massive loss of jobs in almost all sectors of the
economy. In some of the cases workers who have been made redundant have not
been fairly compensated and/or often associated with undue delays in effecting
payments. This has affected the morale of the workers greatly due to uncertainty of
future employment. The problem is aggregated further by lack of a common formula
for computation of terminal benefits. Each SOE had its own terms and conditions of
service on which terminal benefits and retrenchment packages are based. Employees
of different public enterprises are therefore awarded different packages ranging from
generous to nothing.
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3.4.3.6 Transparency
Another obstacle is the question of openness and transparency in the divestiture
process, as well as whether workers need to be direct participants in the privatisation
process. There has been a heightened awareness of workers’ rights to participate. But
this labour heightened awareness has already led to several court cases and
injunctions. Some policy makers and the general public are still questioning the
rationale and benefits of carrying out wholesale privatisation of state assets. There
still exists entrenched notion of public ownership of assets among many Tanzanians.
3.4.3.7 Determining the Economic Value of the Assets:
It would appear that the sale of assets during privatisation is under a buyers market
such that it is the buyers who hold and control the purse. In most of the sales that
have taken place, the economic value of the assets is overruled by what the buyers
offer meaning that whatever the Government might have spent in civil works,
infrastructure developments, etc., it has been considered as "sunk costs". As a result,
the divestiture concluded so far has achieved less than the assets value of the
enterprises. As a matter of fact the bidding process has been saturated with
speculative bidders who present very high bids but ultimately have no capacity to
meet their undertakings in the tenders. The result has caused undue delays in
awarding tenders to deserving bidders.
3.4.3.8 Lack of Sustainability of Operations
Some of the divested public enterprises particularly in the manufacturing sector, have
discontinued production or due to some of the problems stated above while some
others have changed the lines of business from manufacturing to trading or logistics.
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3.5 Setting the Ground for Undertaking Reforms in the Port Industry.
3.5.1 Macro Economic Measures
For smooth implementation of the programme, the government has been working
hard and is committed to creating a conducive climate for private sector
participation. A stable, predictable and conducive macro-economic framework has
been put in place. Inflation in the economy, which has been as high as 40% during
the early 90’s, has been reduced to below 10%, relaxing foreign exchange controls
have been relaxed and the foreign exchange market liberalised. Other measures
include management of the interest rates through liberalisation of the banking
system, improved tax administration following the establishment of the Tanzania
Revenue Authority and the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) system.
Institutional reforms have made it possible for private banks and other financial
institutions to operate in Tanzania.
3.5.2 Investment Promotion
In 1996, the Government thoroughly reviewed its Investment Promotion Policy of
1990, and subsequently approved a new policy that emphasises among other things,
the following:
(a) The encouragement of inflows of external resources to complement
national efforts;
(b) Encouragement and facilitation of the adoption of new technologies in
activities that especially have a direct bearing on productivity, quality and
increased competitiveness;
(c) Enhancement of a transparent legal framework that facilitates the
promotion and protection of all investments;
(d) Deregulation of the investment approval process;
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(e) Re-definition of the role of the private sector, putting it in a more central
role;
(f) Determination of a balance between necessary administrative controls and
market forces as an efficient mechanism of allocating resources;
A new law on investment promotion and protection was enacted in 1997, and the
Tanzania Investment Centre was established to provide for a more effective, efficient
and truly one-stop centre for foreign investors. The new Centre is tasked to remove
all remaining and unnecessary controls and bureaucratic hurdles that impede the
speed at which investment decisions are made. Further development is with respect
to the establishment of Commercial Court to hasten the hearing and disposition of
commercial disputes. Investments in Tanzania are now also fully protected against
arbitrary nationalisation and expropriation. Tanzania has also joined the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
3.5.3 Implementation Strategies
In the transport sector, implementation of the above measures was guided by the
following strategies:
(a) Investment strategy that gives priority to maintenance, rehabilitation and
upgrading of facilities rather than on new construction;
(b) Resource mobilisation strategy targeting on self financing of the transport
sector public organisations in ports, railways, civil aviation and road
transport services and also ensuring full cost recovery of road maintenance
expenditures from user charges for the road infrastructure;
(c) Institutional improvements strategy aiming to enhance efficiency of
resource use through increasing managerial autonomy and accountability
and personal skills and incentives;
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(d) Market liberalisation strategy aimed at increasing private sector
participation in rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructures and
operation of transport services and at achieving complete deregulation of
tariffs in the sector.
3.6 Tanzania Transport Sector Current Status and Divestiture
Alternatives.
3.6.1 Composition of the Transport Sector
The transport sector in Tanzania comprises of four modes of transport namely road,
railways, air and maritime. The road transport is the most widely used and is mainly
operated by the private sector. On the other hand the maritime transport is
instrumental as far as the carriage of international trade is concerned. Overall
responsibility rests with the Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT).
However, responsibility over the road infrastructure rests with the Ministry of Works
(MOW) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The MOW looks after Trunk and
Regional roads while the PMO is responsible for urban, district and rural roads.
There are two railway systems, one under Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) and
the other under the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA). Seaports are
under the Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA) whereas the Tanzania Railways
Corporation operate inland waterways in Lakes Tanganyika, Victoria and Nyasa. The
country has one national air line, Air Tanzania Corporation. The air mode also
consists of three international airports at Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro and Mwanza.
3.6.2 Maritime Transport Sector
The Tanzania Harbours Authority operates three major ports of Dar es Salaam,
Tanga and Mtwara. In 1994, THA in corroboration with the World Bank concluded a
major development study for the port of Dar es Salaam. The study charted a 10 years
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plan, which focused in improving physical, commercial, operational and financial
efficiency of the port.  This was followed by the commercialisation study in 1996,
which looked into the ways of making the organisation to be more commercially
oriented as well as identifying areas for privatisation. In line with government
resolve to transform THA into a landlord status and giving to private operators all the
operational activities of the port, the study recommended establishment of business
units for a concession to private sector developers. The first candidate for
privatisation is the container terminal business unit, which is due to be concessioned
towards the end of 1999. Meanwhile, a study on the concession of the Container
Terminal explaining its status and recommended privatisation options has just been
concluded. Follows up studies are to be conducted to enable THA to conclude
concession agreements of the remaining business units.
3.6.3 Railways
Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) operates the main railway line from Dar es
Salaam to Kigoma is the main link to Burundi, Rwanda and eastern parts of the
Democratic Republic of Congo. There is also a branch at Tabora, which links to
Uganda through Mwanza. TRC also have lines connecting the agricultural rich
regions of Tanga, Kilimanjaro and Arusha. TRC also operates Inland Waterways
Services in lakes Victoria connecting Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, in Lake
Tanganyika, which provide services for DRC, BURUNDI, Rwanda and Zambia and
in Lake Nyasa with services to Malawi. Beginning 1997, TRC entered into a
performance contract with the government, which gave it autonomy for it to operate
on commercial principals. A restructuring programme was commenced
implementation in 1991 for commercial viability and rehabilitation of infrastructure.
Strategy for TRC is to privatise the marine services through sale of shares, which
were not doing well operationally and concession out the operational activities.
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The Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) on the other hand is under
joint ownership of the governments of Tanzania and Zambia. The privatisation is not
being managed by PSRC but through the council of Ministers. The two governments
have granted the corporation autonomy to operate commercially. Discussions are
going on with Zambia Railways and South African Railways towards enhancing
greater co-operation both commercially and technically for possible joint ventures.
The strategy for the TAZARA is deregulation and sale of non- core assets (Hostels,
Quarry).
3.6.4 Air Transport
In the air transport sector, privatisation involves Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC)
and the three international airports of Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro and Mwanza
currently under the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA).  In 1992 the government
liberalised the domestic air transport services thus opening up doors for private
operators, which hitherto was the monopoly of ATC. Since then the number of
private air transport operators has been increasing year after year resulting in
competition and improved services. Privatisation strategy for ATC is sale of shares to
private operators.  Meanwhile, ATC’s subsidiary, the Dar es Salaam Airport Cargo
Handling Company (DAHACO) has been privatised by sale of shares to the South
African Airlines. During 1995, a company by the name of African Joint Air Service
(AJAS) was formed under joint venture between Uganda, South Africa and Tanzania
to undertake international air transport services.
The divestiture programme being implemented in the airports started with the
privatisation process for the Kilimanjaro International Airport (KIA) on a pilot basis.
A concession agreement with a newly formed company namely Kilimanjaro Air Port
Development Company has been signed. The government has retained 24% of the
shares and the remaining shares are to be given to the private sector.
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3.6.5 Road Transport
In the road transport sector, private operators control both freight and passenger
services with more than 90% of the market share. Private operators have also taken
advantage of the ongoing reforms to increasingly become involved. Government
involvement in this area has been through the National Transport Company (NTC),
which was established to provide transport services where private sector participation
was lacking or inadequate. Thus the government established Regional Transport
Companies (RETCOs) in 10 regions and the Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA) to provide
urban transport services in Dar es Salaam under the NTC. Privatisation strategy for
UDA is to form joint venture.  The privatisation of the RETCOs through sale of
shares currently in progress will put almost the entire freight transport market in
private hands. As for the roads sector, private participation is through semi-
autonomous agencies that are to be created under the umbrella of TANROADS.
These will be responsible for the management of operational functions including the
administration of the road fund to be used sorely for repairing and maintenance of
trunk roads.
3.7 Conclusion
For quite some time now, provision of transport infrastructure and services has been
the domain of the public sector. However, as has been explained in this chapter, it
would seem that there is emerging a shift for the public sector from investing in
infrastructure partly due to changed priorities and also lack of funds.  But the private
sector has the money and is looking for attractive opportunities for investment. There
is also considerable pressure from the industry for ports to be more efficient in terms
of service offering, costs, prices, new services etc. Ports are also experiencing
increased competition in the context of globalisation following more countries
becoming aware of the benefits of free trade whereby more and more countries are
now opening their economies to the world markets and removing tariff and non tariff
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barriers to trade. Through global investments developing economies stand to benefit
due to their comparative advantage in terms of low labour costs and natural
endowments that can be utilised to produce goods and services that can compete in
the world market.
The problem now, however, is how to transfer the ownership from the public to
private and continue to command the investments that have been made for a very
long period from tax payers’ money and giving it to private at a low price. What is
the fair price to the investment and how do we go controlling a private monopoly that
will emerge out of the privatisation. None the less, privatisation of the port industry
should go hand in hand with privatisation in other related sectors particularly
railways, road services, multi-modal transport operators, etc.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. Consideration of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative
Reform Methods for Tanzania Harbours Authority
4.1 Introduction.
The chapter discusses the roles that the government and the private sector should
play in providing more efficient port services. This involves determination of the
areas in which competitive market conditions can work and those that require public
action. These parameters provide institutional options that allow governments, public
sector agencies and the private sector groups to assume responsibility for different
aspects of service provision. The reforms place responsibilities for the ownership,
development, operation and provision of labour based on the following criteria:
(a) Those which focus on the enhanced participation of the private sector i.e.:
• Public ownership but with private responsibility for all operation and for
financial risk;
• Private ownership and operation;
(b) Those which aim at improving market relations and enhanced commercial
orientation of the public enterprise i.e. Public ownership and operation
through a public enterprise or government department. The port authority
has to undergo organisational restructuring (Corporatisation);
(c) Community and user provision which considers issues that neither
commercialisation nor competition alone can address. These include issues
of the environment, distribution equity and the need for co-ordination of
investments.
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4.2 Transforming THA From Service to Landlord Port Authority
For THA the reforms aims at establishing a partnership with the private sector in
relation to roles as owner, developer, operator of ports and provider of labour.
This means transforming THA from its current status as a service port to landlord
status. This is necessary for THA to be able to solve the existing problems and
constraints and be able to cope with the increased investments requirements,
competition, efficiency and cost effectiveness. Due to fiscal constraints in most
developing countries, there is considerable pressure for ports to look for additional
sources of financing something that cannot be realised under existing arrangements.
In Landlord ports, the private sector becomes more and more involved in providing
port services in partnership with the public sector. The port authority is responsible
for the provision of infrastructure while the private sector is responsible for provision
of superstructure and labour. To perform these functions, the port authority owns,
develops and maintains the infrastructure (including land) which is leased out to
private companies. The private companies provide port services such as stevedoring,
warehousing, distribution centres, pilotage, industry, bunkering etc. labour is
contracted out by private stevedoring companies. Most ports are now moving from
service ports to landlord port status. Examples of landlord ports include Rotterdam in
the Netherlands, Miami in USA and Antwerp in Belgium.
The business units concept is beneficial to THA in that the individual business units
become more aware of what their costs and revenues are, and of the actions they
need to take to service their customers more effectively. The units can also develop
their own organisational structures suited to the needs of their own market sector and
the personalities of the people running them.  This arrangement will also enable THA
to proceed with reforms at different paces covering different parts of the business and
progress gradually, trying out changes on one part of the business before you roll
them out to others.
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In between service port and landlord ports are the so-called Tool Ports. Tool ports
have features of both service ports and landlord ports except for labour, which is
provided by the private sector. In a tool port the port authority provides infrastructure
and at times also some superstructure which it leases to private operators. The private
sector on the other hand provides labour, but at times can be required also to provide
additional cargo-handling equipment. Operating tool ports include Aarhus in
Denmark, Le-Havre in France.
Most ports in developing countries are service ports. This has been historical as
countries viewed ports to be catalysts for overall economic development. Hence the
main objective has been to provide service to the economy and create employment.
Commercial operation was regarded as secondary. In recent years however, ports
have increasingly embraced private capital of which the main objective is profit
hence their being required to operate on commercial viability criteria.
In addressing the inefficiencies of port services governments around the world have
applied three grand strategies to improve port performance. These strategies are
deregulation/liberalisation, commercialisation, privatisation and corporatisation.
4.3 Deregulation/ Liberalisation
The active involvement of the private sector in port operations is dependent on the
existence of an ideal and attractive market environment. The ideal environment will
be created through deregulation and liberalisation measures. This entails the
unbundling of the monopolies by the relaxation of formerly rigid or constraining
degrees of economic regulation thereby making market response and entry free and
or providing operators greater flexibility to invest, alter operations and services and
fix and negotiate tariffs.
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The objective of deregulation and liberalisation policies is to enhance performance
by creating competition in the market. Deregulation introduces a public organisation
to competition in certain port activities previously reserved to statutory monopoly by
permitting the private sector to provide port services to common users and thereby
competing with the status quo public organisation providing the same services. This
can be achieved by:
(a) Having rules and regulations that are potentially attractive to the private
sector investors and developers of new operations and services and by
allowing them to fix and negotiate tariffs;
(b) The elimination or reduction of restrictive rules and regulations in order to
liberalise the market and promote efficiency without necessarily altering the
mission and objectives of the port.
Economies and ports which undertake deregulation and liberalisation measures are
set to realise the following advantages:
(a) Restoration of competition to a market that is distorted by excessive
regulations i.e. remove regulations that restrict, limit and prohibit
competition by controlling entry, exit, prices;
(b) Instils flexibility in the market by restoring efficiency, freedom to hire
labour negotiate salaries and free exit and entry into the mark;
(c) Cost reduction due to reduced bureaucracy;
(d) Elimination of unwanted distortions due to cross subsidisation;
(e) Improves financial viability hence makes it possible to attract investors;
(f) Feasible price setting closer to the social optimum due to less (over)
regulation.
On the negative side deregulation should be carefully implemented in a market of
limited competition as the deregulation of tariffs may be harmful to customers. State
owned enterprises are unable to compete on an equal footing with private sector
companies permitted to provide third party services because they are still constrained
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in terms of technology, restrictive work practices and being required to serve as
employment centres. Also deregulation of employment may have impact on port
workers leading to changes in employee altitudes, layoffs etc. So it is important for
ports to continue negotiations with the unions for effective deregulation.
For Tanzania and ports in particular, deregulation and liberalisation measures are
necessary because they represent a shift in decision making from the centre
(government) to the private sector for both operational, market and investments
aspects. Indeed these are important steps to make since the private sector is known
for being fast and commercially sensitive. For the private sector to make full use of
its allocative efficiency and make profit for the economy, it must operate in a
competitive environment.
4.4 Commercialisation
This strategy involves the changing public port authorities into commercially viable
enterprises. In this aspect the public authority management is given the autonomy
and accountability for the decisions and its performance. To attain commercial
viability, structural and management changes are introduced in the public port or it is
contracted out.
The primary objective of commercialisation is to make an enterprise to operate
within the discipline of the market so as to lead to more efficient services greater
flexibility and less dependence on government support. Most scholars argue that
commercialisation is a stepping stone towards privatisation to enable the port to
acquire management experience towards more private sector involvement. It is also
an important step for safeguarding the acquired prerogatives and vested interests of
the public sector.
56
Commercialisation of state enterprises addresses three major issues:
(a) Limiting the role of the government as provider of port services sometimes
in direct competition with private sector;
(b) Streamlining the decision making process with a view to making it cost
effective and introduce accountability;
(c) Making the port responsible to port users by providing services according
to market demands, abiding to market discipline and business principals.
Advantages
There are several advantages for a public organisation to undergo commercialisation:
(a) Enables the introduction of cost /profit centres focused on efficient use of
resources (inputs vis-à-vis outputs);
(b) Makes the public enterprise to stand on its own feet and be accountable for
what it does;
(c) Becoming more responsive to user needs;
(d) Introduces more flexibility in the organisation;
(e) There is less government control but is able to retain public financing for
major capital projects;
(f) There is more management freedom in making decisions especially in
aspects of tariffs, investments and employment.
Disadvantages
The major problem with commercialisation is that not enough autonomy is usually
granted to port management hence limited flexibility to pursue strategic goals
especially those related to foreign business or investment opportunities, gain access
to additional capital to pursue corporate objectives. Commercialisation also does not
get rid of bureaucratic constraints, as countries are reluctant to relinquish stringent
control over ports because of traditional importance of ports to the country’s
economy, employment etc. Again, it is difficult to achieve commercialisation
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objectives in the absence of competition. Commercialisation is a slow process and its
effectiveness depends on the realisation of four basic changes:
(a) Gradual introduction of more commercial policies in the areas of tariffs,
marketing and customer servicing;
(b) Changes in the size and structure of the labour force, renegotiations of its
terms and conditions of employment. This can not be easily realised in
Tanzania given the existing rigid labour laws;
(c) Changes in attitudes and cultures in line to that of private sector by the
management and staff. Unfortunately this has been a long-standing problem
in THA and other state owned companies;
(d) Redefinition of the port’s legal status and relationships with the
government.
Given the above constraints, commercialisation cannot be an effective choice for
THA.
4.5 Management Contract
A management contract is an arrangement whereby the private sector management,
skills and or technology are provided under a contract to a state owned enterprise for
an agreed period of time and compensation. The contractor assumes responsibility
for compensation with full management control and authority to manage. The
financial risk remains with the port authority. Under a management contract, the port
authority retains ownership of the assets and is responsible for provision of further
capital.
The objective of having a Management Contract is to enhance the efficiency and
effective us of state assets in mostly service ports where performance of the port
authority as an operator has not been satisfactory. Management contracts are often
used, as temporary measures to gear the state owned enterprise to an acceptable level
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of operations and profitability before divestment. During the period of the contract
the assets are improved to become more attractive and hence able to command a
better price from the private sector investors.
The advantages of a management contract include:
(a) Use of specified skills which are not readily available within the
organisation or locally;
(b) Use of specified skills that are not required full time thus allowing
flexibility in response to changes in demand or availability of resources;
(c) Brings capital savings in equipment, investment;
(d) Introduces a port to new and better business  cultures and ethics;
(e) Raises efficiency by increasing specialisation;
(f) Creates a yard stick for comparison of costs;
(g) Permits greater exploitation of economies of scale for processes or
activities;
(h) By bringing in foreign management it is possible to establish a network of
international contacts that makes it easier to mobilise funds and promote the
port.
Disadvantages
It should be noted however that management expertise is lacking in most developing
countries making it necessary to source them from outside. This is an expensive
undertaking bearing in mind that the countries have to utilise their scarce foreign
exchange resources to pay for the fees, salaries and benefits for the management
team. The huge salary difference between the expatriate staff and the local creates
dissatisfaction on the part of the local staff making them unwilling to support their
counterparts. Management contracts also require that investments need to be made
during the initial stage of the contract to prepare the port to perform to the agreed
thresholds. This requirement is often not met in time resulting in contract failure as it
happened in Mombassa Kenya in 1997. (The port of Mombassa had commissioned
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the port of Felixstowe England to operate the container terminal in the form off
management contract. The contract was terminated because the government could
not guarantee the required autonomy and did not act fast enough to provide financing
for the purchase of equipment and rehabilitation of the terminal). THA has enough
experienced and trained management. However, THA’s biggest problem is that the
government has not granted the management enough autonomy to demonstrate their
capabilities.
4.6 Privatisation
Privatisation involves the transfer of ownership of all or certain parts of a port’s land
infrastructure and or equipment from the public to the private sector. This strategy is
normally a follow up stage after commercialisation, management contract, or
deregulation/liberalisation strategies have not been successful or have only achieved
modest results. The objective of privatisation is achieving efficiency and
effectiveness and greater economic growth by encouraging competition and
emphasising more on the role of market forces in economic activities. Private sector
participation in port takes various forms. The main options are:
4.6.1 Sale of Assets
This involves the transfer of ownership of infrastructure, superstructure and
equipment from the public to the private investor by:
(a) Sale of shares to the general public (Public issue or offer) quoted in the
stock exchange. Arrangements can be made for employees and small
investors to be given preference. For a big corporation like THA this option
is not favourable because the financial institutions are not well developed
as a source of capital. Also the stock exchange where people can buy and
sell shares has just been established and there is lack of greater public
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awareness of investment risks coupled with limited communication system
of financial information;
(b) Sale of assets (not shares) through competitive tender and is open to any
company or consortia but sale is made to one bidder. Employees can
participate through MEBO typically funded by institutional equity and debt;
(c) Acquisition of the port by the existing management team (excluding other
employees) through a Management Buy Out. Acquisition by an external
management team is also possible though Management Buy In;
(d) Negotiated sale with a single buyer who may be a trade buyer or MEBO.
MEBO arrangements have an advantage that it provides strong financial
incentives to management and employees and promotes good industrial
relations. But it has not been popular in Tanzania on three aspects. First
existing management is usually constrained in terms of commercial
experience hence its effectiveness is mostly doubtful. Secondly it might be
difficult for the workers to have the financial resources to enable them to
participate in the purchase. Thirdly the decision to sell to company
employees may be viewed by the rest of the public as unfair for them not to
take part.
4.6.2 Concessions (BOT, Leases)
Concessions entail arrangements that provide the right to finance, build and operate a
facility of the port or some equipment for public use. The advantage of a concession
is that it relieves the finances of the port authority in that it is the concessionaire who
pre-finances the whole operation, operates, and maintains the facilities and recovers
its investments through tariffs. It also permits the port authority to attract capital
especially foreign without long term control over its vital port facilities. Besides the
positive aspects of concessions, care should be taken to ensure that the
concessionaire does not hold a dominant position, there is transparency and that
financing of new investments and maintenance is sustained.
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Concessions are of two basic types i.e. Lease arrangements and Build Operate
Transfer (BOT) schemes.
Lease agreement involves the right to use an existing asset for an agreed period of
time in return for a payment or series of payments by the lessee to the port authority.
The lessee does not invest but simply benefits from the use of the port authority’s
investments. The leaseholder however, assumes full responsibility and commercial
risks of operations.
Under the BOT schemes, the private sector builds and operates the new port
facilities for an agreed period say 25 years, with ownership transferring to the state
there after. In this arrangement the port authority exercises regulatory functions to
ensure the healthy growth of the port through proper performance standards, safety
and pricing policies. Due to the investment requirements to be made by the private
sector, most BOT agreements are of long term nature. The problem for THA is that
local private investment capability is lacking meaning that this scheme can only
benefit foreigners who might have other priorities.
4.6.3 Joint Ventures
This involves the setting up, by two or more investors, of a jointly owned
independent organisation. Joint ventures have the strong advantage in that parties are
able to share the risks expressed in terms of costs and profits. It is also the best way
in which transfer of technology and expertise is built in. Local participation can be
assured through joint ventures. However, greater care is needed while selecting a
competent and committed joint venture partners and negotiates acceptable terms.
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4.7 Corporatisation
This strategy involves the establishment of a company owned by the government
under the Corporations Act to perform the business of providing port services.
Corporatisation, which is normally a prelude to privatisation, involves legal changes
to grant the port authority and operators administrative and financial autonomy from
the central government. The ownership of the company can be a mixed one in which
private interests are represented with the presence of the government or another
public entity such as development bank.  The biggest advantage for this kind of
arrangement is that the port attains greater freedom in port operations by having full
autonomy while the government keeps control of the port. The risks are minimised
by sharing of the investment costs.
4.8 Labour Reforms
In a service port labour is usually provided by the port authority. When this has
changed the relations in respect to employment of the workers, structure and
remuneration also changes. Thus in the landlord and tool ports, the labour supply
becomes private and is contracted out by private stevedoring companies. In
Tanzania, the need to undertake labour reforms in the port industry is due to:
(a) over employment which is a result of policy objectives of creating
employment which were pursued by most service ports;
(b) Increased application of capital intensive cargo handling systems especially
in container handling and introducing appropriate technology and cargo
handling systems;
(c) poor corporate and business oriented culture among the employees of
service ports;
(d) poor management practices;
(e) inappropriate organisation structure;
(f) increasing labour costs;
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(g) inadequate information and operational systems;
(h) Overall inefficiency;
(i) Changing the skills mix and introducing “young blood”. The majority of
dockworkers are not very well prepared in terms of skills to man
sophisticated and expensive equipment. The majority of the workers are
now past the age of 45 years, which is another limitation in this regard
(Please see Figure No. 4 below).
Figure No. 4
Source: Study on the preparation of concession for the container terminal
Dar Es Salaam port by CPCS Transcom -interim report 1998
Labour reforms are one of the most sensitive and complex issues of the privatisation
process in any country. This is because in most cases it involves massive loss of jobs
creating adverse social and economic impacts. In THA, the port authority is
providing labour which it employees under permanent terms. The authority also
maintains a pool of 600 labourers for casual work in the dry bulk cargo handling
operations. Plans are under way to decrease the permanent labour force and increase
casual labour. It is in the interest of the government to limit the negative impacts
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associated with labour reforms taking into account that Tanzania is a developing
country with abundant cheap labour with limited opportunities for alternative
employment.
Since 1994, THA has been carrying out labour reforms to achieve optimum
workforce and reduce costs. Actions taken include restricting fresh employment,
undertaking retrenchments, and encouraging early retirements through incentives and
golden handshake. As expected labour reforms have not been popular and the
workers are disillusioned following massive loss of jobs and problems relating to the
adequacy and timely compensation to those who have been retired or laid off. The
workers would not wish the repeat of the experience of 1977 following the collapse
of the EAHC and EACHS, and establishment of THA. Until today, some of the ex-
workers of the defunct East African Corporations are yet to be paid in full their
terminal benefits. It is only logical that the workers are demanding active
participation in the privatisation programme. Also they are demanding for fair
treatment and guarantees on continued employment, payment of fair retrenchment
packages and salary for those who opt to remain in employment.
4.9 The Recommended Approach
Privatisation is a long and complex process. This is a new concept in the ownership
and management of ports for most developing countries including Tanzania. The
country has no experience hence the need to learn from the experience of other ports,
which have successfully implemented privatisation. Based on the foregoing, a phased
approach to privatisation is recommended for THA. First the authority needs to be
transformed to a more commercially oriented port. This is necessary for the port to
cultivate a commercial culture and work in accordance with the requirements of the
market. At this juncture, it will be in a position to attract private investors and
operators in the port. Secondly the port is to be transformed from a service port to
landlord port status. This means that the operational activities of the port are
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subdivided into business units, which are then put on concession or leased to the
private operators. The transfer of the business units to the private sector need to be
gradual to allow for a smooth transition, lessen the impact of privatisation and
provide a ground to gain experience as we move along. A typical privatisation
process for THA is presented in Figure No. 5.
4.10 Conclusion
The mission of a port is to contribute constructively to the nation's economic well
being. There was a time when only governments had the resources and could attract
the expertise to fund, build, operate and regulate ports. That time is passing.
Governments are now asking the ports and its users to pay their fair share. Policies
are focussing on enhancing the commercial orientation of port service providers.
They are increasingly looking to the private sector to take over services as owners or
concessionaires.
Fully liberalised port operations services gives port users a choice of services and
cost-based, competitive and non-discriminatory prices. For port operators, a
deregulated port sector offers no restrictions on the number of service providers
except as limited by market demand or scarce resources. (See also Appendix 5 for
activities that are open to private operators and investors).
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Summary Of  Privatisation Process For Tanzania Harbours Authority.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. Scope of the Privatisation of the Tanzania Harbours Authority
5.1 The Privatisation Process
5.1.1 The Legal Framework
The THA Act of 1977 gives the authority wide ranging powers regarding the
development, ownership and operation of ports in the country. The act provides that
the organisation should conduct its business according to commercial principles and
to ensure that earnings are adequate to cover expenses. The act also provides for
THA to enter into contracts with third parties for the provision of its services such as
stevedoring, terminal operations etc. However, with enhanced private sector
participation through privatisation there is need to have adequate legal authority for
implementing the proposed changes. Privatisation will result in change of character
for THA from a service authority to a landlord port authority. This will require the
revision of the levels of authority in the management of the port industry i.e. the
government, the port authority and the private sector. Therefore the legal framework
should define the new roles of the three authorities viz.:
(a) The role of the government or Ministry responsible for ports and harbours;
(b) Establishment and role of a regulatory authority independent of the
government;
(c) The relationships between the port authority (Landlord) vis-a-vis the private
operators.
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The Public Corporation Act of 1993 established and empowers the PSRC to
undertake privatisation of specified corporations. It also stipulates the key players
involved in the privatisation process.
In order for THA to be able to undertake Concession and Lease contracts, the Land
Ordinance need to be reviewed.  Under the Land Ordinance, lease, sell, mortgage,
transfer of land etc government approval through the Commissioner for Lands must
be obtained first.
5.1.2 The Sale Process
The main activities involves:
(a) Advertising the proposals to private seeking interest from potential bidders;
(b) Preparation of short list of bidders, select privatisation model and prepare
detailed invitation to tender i.e. information memorandum, detailed
tendering conditions and draft legal documentation.
5.1.3 Business Valuation
Getting the valuation “right” is important for both management and investors in
making the right business decisions, get the best terms from the bidder and have what
the market can bear (buyer is prepared to pay for). Valuation of divestiture assets on
the other hand depends on the profitability of the enterprise. For Tanzania, however,
adequate business valuation is sidelined, instead the Government has shown more
interest in selling loss-making enterprises, while private buyers are more interested in
those that are potentially able to make profit. It is the author’s view that where a state
owned enterprise is to be sold, it is prudent that it should be sold for its market value.
Hence valuation is important in determining the price offered and to have a
transparent process. The valuations provide benchmarks against which to compare
both bid and negotiated prices. Valuations are usually done at two levels:
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a) Company valuations based on a “going concern concept” to determine
present value. The going concern concept entails that value arises from the
ability to generate future earnings or cash flows rather than accumulation of
assets in the past. Thus company valuation method is normally used to
calculate the net present value of projected cash flows discounted at a rate
considered appropriate for the risks involved in the pertinent economic,
business and technical context. This method is useful for concessions and
joint venture agreements;
b) Asset valuation on fixed assets of a state owned enterprise where the
option is to sale the assets. This aspect could also cover real estate (land,
buildings), plant (machinery and equipment) and movable assets such as
motor-vehicles etc. It is proposed that assets be valued on the depreciated
replacement cost method, which entails making an estimate of what it
would cost to replace a similar piece of equipment or machine at current
prices and depreciating that amount for its age.
5.1.4 Selection of Mode of Privatisation
Conducting a functional analysis of port institutional framework and allocating
functions according to strategic business units does this. In THA this was realised by
the commercialisation study in 1996 followed by the THA privatisation review in
1997.
5.1.5 Preparation of Information Memorandum.
The information memorandum provide potential investors with information about the
SOE or BU slated for privatisation so that they could use it to undertake their due
diligence investigations. The information included is on legal status and ownership,
nature of business, markets and market share, main services and suppliers,
organisation and management, fixed assets, financial performance, and information
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on employees and conditions of services. Information memorandum for the ongoing
privatisation of the Container Terminal has been prepared through a study known as
“Preparation of Concession for the Container Terminal Dar es Salaam Port” in 1998.
5.1.6 Bid Evaluation
This is performed by the “Divestiture Technical Committee” established by the
PSRC. The bid submitted is supposed to assist THA to attain the predetermined
privatisation objectives hence evaluation exercise looks into this through the set
criteria below:
(a) Investment programme;
(b) Financing plan;
(c) Sales projections;
(d) Revenue to the government;
(e) Marketing plan;
(f) Employment retention and generation;
(g) Introduction of new technologies.
Summary of the processes involved in privatisation of state owned enterprises are
presented in Figure No. 6 and the Criteria used by PSRC to evaluate bids is
presented in Appendix 4.
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5.2 New Roles of Landlord Port Authority
The vision of THA under the reform programme is to transform the existing
relationships of a service port to those of the landlord whereby the operational
activities of the port are to be managed in partnership with the private sector. In this
new arrangement, the port authority will have limited role to play in the ownership,
operation and management of the ports. The port authority’s role and sphere of
influence will be in three main areas:
5.2.1 Developmental Roles
The port authority will be responsible for policy, planning and infrastructure
development. The activities will include evolving port and corporate policy,
developing strategic master plans, traffic forecasting and looking for funds for
infrastructure development. The port authority will also be responsible for long term
plans for land not yet developed, providing adequate maintenance of major
infrastructure works, maintenance of minimum performance standards regarding
annual throughput, berth times, cargo dwell times. In order to do this operators are
required to report operational data that will allow the port authority to monitor the
proper execution of the concession agreement.
5.2.2 Regulatory Roles
Privatisation will attract several players who will be performing services in varied
port activities competitively. Due to a narrow traffic base, effective competition is
possible to a limited extent hence the activities of the private operators need to be co-
ordinated and regulated to make sure that they are satisfying their customers’ needs,
complying to public policy objectives and to limit the emergency of private
monopolies. Therefore the port authority has to oversee that there is:
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a) Transparency and openness of the system;
b) Clear articulation of regulatory objectives and the tariff setting mechanism;
c) A legal structure that clearly defines the rules and procedures that allow
participation of the private sector;
d) The conditions of market entry and exit of private companies;
e) A well defined process for issuing permits and licenses, allocating land, etc.
Thus the responsibility of the port authority will cover activities relating to licensing,
traffic control in the port and maritime accesses, regulation and follow up of
dangerous cargoes, port state control, environmental protection and aids to
navigation.
5.2.3 Provision of Corporate Services
The privatisation strategy adopted requires for a few common services to be supplied
to the BU. These services can be provided by THA more efficiently than the BU
themselves because of their scale and also being common in all.  The port authority
will therefore be responsible for the provision of corporate and administrative
services of the ports in the areas of finance, human resources development,
marketing and public relations, Security, Fire and safety. Another major role of the
port authority can be to maintain a casual labour pool that individual BU can draw to
supplement their permanent labour forces at times of peak demand. The port
authority can also set up EDI system, which provides computer links between all
major users of the port and related organisations such as customs.
Upon completion of the privatisation process, the orgainisation structure of THA will
change in line with its new roles. The structure that takes into consideration the
above major functions is as shown in Figure 7 below.
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Figure No. 7
5.3 Economic and Social Impacts of Privatisation
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One of the objectives of privatisation is to reduce the burden of public enterprises on
the government budget. This is achieved by elimination of subsidies and ensuring
that services are provided on commercial basis and are able to earn profit on which it
can be able to pay dividends to the shareholders and the government. Privatisation
also will result in more income for the government from corporation tax. This was
not possible during the time of public monopoly enterprises because most of them
were not making any profits but depended on government subvention in terms of
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subsidies and operating capital. A good example of this is the Tanzania Breweries
Limited which after privatisation in 1993 had doubled sales tax income to the
government from 12 billion to 24 billion Tanzania shillings. The company was also
able to pay dividends of 9 million Tanzania shillings for the first time in its history in
1995.
5.3.2 Impact on Productivity
During privatisation, port labour is reorganised both in terms of structure, number
and practices. New and improved labour practices as well as technologies are applied
resulting in improved productivity and reduced costs.  This works particularly well in
bulk cargo and container handling. Improved efficiency of the port will also be
realised due to limited government interference, coupled with, streamlined
operations, improved management and less bureaucracy. According to the study on
the concession of the container terminal at Dar es Salaam port, low productivity is
due to inadequate investments, cumbersome THA operating procedures and poor
staff motivation.  All these factors are associated with the institutional framework of
the organisation and will improve with the enhanced private sector participation.
Ports, which have opted for privatisation, have their productivity improved.
Examples include Port Kelang in Malaysia where, according toESCAP/3 (1998)
report, average stay of ships improved from 12 days to 3.8 days and container
throughput increased by 12% in 1987.
5.3.3 Impact on Investments
Cumbersome regulations and procedures that hinder timely mobilisation of funds and
investments often surround most public enterprises. It so happens that the
management is slow to decide on taking loans or even using the Authority’s own
funds for making major investments. The capital budget has to be submitted to the
government for approval. The criteria on which the approval is granted are
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sometimes not related to the expected economic returns to the investment but to
various extended and non-economic factors. Privatisation will give the authority
more autonomy in raising loans or funding means of self financing and using more
professional expertise in investment planning. Privatisation will revive some of the
facilities, which are in poor state enabling the port to diversify some activities
relating not only to vessel and cargo-related services but off-dock services as well.
Increased investments through BOT schemes will lead to improved services and
lower costs. An example of a successful privatisation is the Tanzania Breweries
limited where after privatisation production increased from 4.5 million cases in 1993
to 9.8 million cases in 1996.  Market share also increased from 31% to 75% during
the period.
5.3.4 Impact on Technology
International participation through various privatisation schemes will impact on
transfer of technology, management skills and business cultures
5.3.5 Impact on Ports’ Competitiveness
Competition promotes efficiency and provides users with options that in turn make
infrastructure providers more accountable. Opening up business to private sector not
only brings with it access to investments and new technology, but also more bodies
who are already trained to run business, are more experienced, specialised and
disciplined. The private sector is also very aggressive, cost conscious and responds
faster to market needs. These are essential qualities for effective competition.
5.3.6 Impact on Tariff Setting and Marketing
Tariffs are a function of several factors. These include investment recovery, port
costs, taxation, competition, and volume of traffic and what the market can bear.
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Under a privatised THA the operators will have autonomy to charge directly for their
services and institute their own pricing strategies based on their assessment of the
above factors. The tariff system will have to be as responsive to the market as
possible. Government involvement in the tariff setting mechanism, which has in the
past been associated with delays and lack of focus on the market will be minimal.
5.3.7 Negative Impacts
5.3.7.1 Retrenchments/Loss of Jobs and Insecurity of Work
The most notable negative effect of privatisation is loss of jobs through
retrenchments and layoffs. This has taken place in almost every port, which
introduces privatisation or other types of reform as evidenced in Appendix 6. So far
in THA more than 3,000 employees have been laid off as the organisation prepares
itself for privatisation. This is a very big problem for a country where alternative
work is non-existence. This has also far-reaching consequences on society
considering that the dependent ratio is very high in Tanzania where about 10 people
owe their living on one working person. Continued reduction of the workforce and
reduced security of employment for those who remain on the payroll of the privatised
firms causes unrest among the workers and increased resistance to further
privatisation among the trade unions. This further leads to low morale of the workers
due to uncertainty of future employment.
5.3.7.2 Foreign Ownership
Because of low financial capability of the local entrepreneurs, it is mostly the
foreigners who win tenders to own and operate privatised firms. Since the
commencement of the privatisation programme local participation has been very
minimal. As a matter of fact most companies have been privatised to foreign firms.
This trend is expected to continue in the port industry as well. So far the privatisation
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of the Container Terminal has attracted five multinational companies all of which
have no local interest in them. Increased foreign ownership is associated with capital
flight and non-commitment to long term national interests.
5.4 THA Business Units Current Status and Divestiture Alternatives
5.4.1 Container Terminal
The Container Terminal has three deep-water berths with a capacity of handling 120,000
TEUs per Annum. The quay length is 550 metres.  Facilities include 3 ship to shore gantry
cranes, 16 RTG, 1 RMG, straddle carriers/front-end loaders and other terminal equipment.
Back up facilities for the Container Terminal includes an Inland Container Depot located
about 2 Kilometres outside the port.  The container terminal is one of the most important BU
for THA.  Currently the terminal handles about 100,000 TEUs per annum against rated
capacity of 120,000 TEUs per annum. Throughput has been increasing year after year. The
importance of the Container Terminal is poised to grow further at the expense of the General
Cargo Terminal given the international cargo traffic trends and market developments.
Container penetration in the dry general cargo trade has reached more than 60%. The
terminal, which has recently been modernised and expanded through World Bank funding, is
in very good shape and very well maintained. Investment requirements are therefore
relatively low. The facility is considered to be a very attractive BU for the private sector. The
terminal has been chosen to be the first candidate for privatisation under concession
arrangements. The process commenced with a study, which was commissioned in 1998. The
study tasks were:
(a) Preparation of the information memorandum for the private operators;
(b) Assessment of the most appropriate form of privatisation;
(c) Preparation of the tendering documents;
(d) Assistance during tendering process;
(e) Drafting of the concession agreement.
At the time of writing of this report, bids from five pre-qualified bidders (all foreign
international companies) have been received and were being evaluated.
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5.4.2 General Cargo Terminal
The re-paved General Cargo Terminal has eight deep-water berths to cater for dry
break bulk cargo. It has eight sheds with a total floor area of 81,040 square meters in
the port. It is equipped with 28 Portal Cranes (5-7 ton capacity), 27-Yard Cranes (3-5
ton capacity), 119 forklift trucks (2.5 – 3.5 ton capacity), and 44 tractors and 86
trailers. The annual throughput is currently around 1.5 million tonnes against rated
capacity of 2.5 million tonnes per annum. This is the biggest BU within THA and
employs the largest number of workers, about 60% of the total employees of the port.
Some areas of the general cargo terminal were rehabilitated under the World Bank
funding in 1990. However, other areas of the terminal still require some
improvement in resurfacing and equipment. A relatively high level of investments
will be required. This may limit the BU’s attractiveness to outside investors and
which therefore may have difficulty in attracting capital market support. The market
for the traffic is not very bright due to competition from neighbouring ports
particularly for transit cargo. Privatisation of this BU will have some implications in
terms of organisation, personnel and operations. The ideal privatisation approach for
this BU is to divide it into at least three units to be leased to different operators. This
will instil an element of competition and also optimise the utilisation of the facilities.
There had been private sector interest in operating some parts of the terminal. In
1996 NOTCO submitted proposal for the lease of the berth No 1 (Belbase area) as a
private terminal for 20 years and have indicated their willingness to invest 4 million
US $ for its development. THA did not consider this proposal any further because of
the uncertainty about the way the berths were to be privatised. The author
recommends follow up of these initiatives.
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5.4.3 Dry Bulk Handling.
The Grain Terminal has a fully automated silo for handling import and export grains.
Discharge is by a grab/hoppers system including three bagging units. Grain is
transferred from the quay by 10 dump tractors. The silo is aerated and temperature
controlled and has a holding capacity of 30,000 tons. Fumigation facilities are also
available to protect the grains against damage by moulds or insects but there are
some environmental considerations of air pollution and dust arising from the open
handling method.   Investment requirements are low; there are relatively few
employment implications. There are some positive contributions from the market due
to the ideal facilities and strategic location for grain imports into Tanzania and
Central African countries.
There have been moves to have private participation in the operation of this facility.
NECTAR Company of France has showed interest to enter into Joint Venture with
THA since 1994. The signing of the contract agreement was delayed due to
disagreement in relation to:
(a) Value of the assets;
(b) The amount of the lease rentals;
(c) Amount to be paid as NECTAR’S management fee.
There has been no further progress since the start of the privatisation programme
under PSRC. It is however recommended continuing with the Joint Venture option.
5.4.4 Bulk Liquid Handling
There are two facilities for handling of liquid products. The Single Point Mooring
(SPM) is an off shore berth for tankers to moor and discharge crude oil for refineries
in Dar es Salaam and Ndola in Zambia. The buoy can accommodate tankers of up to
100,000 DWT and can handle 5,000 tons per hour. The draught at the buoy is thirty
metres. White products are handled at the Kurasini Oil Jetty (KOJ) which has the
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capacity to handle Tankers of up to 45,000 (DWT). The SBM needs substantial
investments while the KOJ has recently been upgraded. The market for KOJ is quite
bright, but that of SBM is in doubt following the Government’s decision to liberalise
the importation of oil a well as the local oil market.  Since the facility serves
refineries in Tanzania and Zambia, its privatisation will have serious strategic,
political and social implications. Environmental considerations are other important
factors for this BU. The privatisation options for KOJ and SBM is short-term lease
and BOT arrangements respectively.
5.4.5 Marine Services
The Marine Services include pilotage, tug services, traffic control communications,
navigational aids, hydrographic, shipping rules and regulations and other
miscellaneous services to ships. It also provides some regulatory and enforcement
responsibilities on behalf of the government. The unit provides positive contribution
to THA and is strategic for rating the quality of a port by shipping companies. The
unit suffers from poor quality of services to vessels due to poor maintenance and
spare part difficulties. Although consultants have recommended that the unit be put
on lease on Vessel Management Contract and Franchise, the author’s view is to
retain the services under the port authority due to the sensitivity of the BU and the
central role it plays in serving other business units.
5.4.6 Passenger Terminal and Lighter Quay
Not much attention was being paid to this BU by THA on the pretext that it is not a
core business. Admittedly it is one of the fastest growing activities which THA
cannot afford to ignore any longer. Currently most of the facilities are in poor state of
repair and the whole area is in need of redevelopment. This area comprises the fast
ferry passenger terminal encompassing a group of small berths used for various
purposes including:
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(a) Gerezani creek comprising of reclaimed lands about 2.25 hectares. There
are berthing facilities but the area is suitable for building warehousing and
storage facilities;
(b) Malindi wharf, which is 139 metres long, is used by small coastal vessels
carrying passengers and cargo. The area requires resurfacing and re-
fending;
(c) Lighter Wharf with 204 metres long is used for berthing of THA crafts
including Tugs, Pilot Launches, Boats and also private Fishing Vessels and
Dhows. The buildings are in poor condition and unused while the open
spaces have been used for dumping of old marine equipment.
(d) Dhow owners, shippers and consignees privately use dhow quay of about
90 metres long with a very narrow apron of 20 metres. THA supervision of
the activities here is minimal leading to area being congested and busy;
(e) TACOSHILI wharf with 105 metres is currently not being used because the
company is not operating;
(f) Passenger terminal comprises of a large area much of, which is unused
except for the maintenance of fast ferries. It comprises of the passenger
wharf and landing pontoon, the TACOSHILI coastal passenger terminal,
the ferry passenger terminal (Baggage room) and the access ship road. Due
to increased importance of passenger transport needs between Dar es
Salaam and Zanzibar, the terminal is in need of expansion and provision of
safety mechanisms for both passengers and vessels. The business units are
to be privatised under BOT arrangements.
5.4.7 Tanga and Mtwara Ports
Tanga port has rated capacity to handle 500,000 tonnes while Mtwara port is rated to
handle 400, 000 tonnes of general cargo. The market for these ports is severely
depressed making them to operate below 25% capacity utilisation. There are no great
prospects for growth hence it will be difficult for both ports to attract private
83
investors.  However, the two ports are of significant importance to the regions they
serve. There are considerable employment and personnel implications as well. On
this note short term privatisation plans for these ports should focus on:
(a) Increased autonomy in relation to issues such as tariffs, employment;
(b) Concentration of management effort on core business;
(c) Divestiture of support activities such as security, real estates, fire etc;
(d) Transfer of other activities to the private sector as soon as viable
opportunities can be obtained;
Long term efforts should be directed at utilising the ports for facilitation of
transhipment traffic in the East African region. In this regard the government should
take action to improve inland transport links to these ports and interest the shipping
lines to invest at these ports.
Summary of Consultants recommended privatisation options is presented in
Appendix 7.
5.5 Strategies for Setting Concession and Lease Tariff Rates for the
Landlord Port Authority.
Contracting out services and facilities is a standard feature of landlord port
authorities. The privatisation of THA entails that most of the port activities will be
contracted out to private operators. This means that the major source of revenue for
the landlord port will come from concessions and leases. In fixing the fees to be
paid, consideration should be made for the private operator to attract more traffic to
the port and at the same time provide an assured income on the part of the landlord
port authority. Prospective private operators and investors should therefore be
assessed as to their ability to attract traffic and how the commercial risk is spread
between the port authority and the operator. There are basically three strategies of
achieving this:
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(a) Recovering the costs of the facilities plus a suitable rate of return on the
assets by applying the fixed sum strategy. This is not a suitable method for
THA because of the low traffic levels currently being handled;
(b) Applying the Mini-Max strategy that requires agreeing on a minimum and
maximum levels with payment calculated based on the actual traffic
handled. This can be an effective strategy for THA because future traffic is
very unpredictable. However, good traffic forecasting and performance
monitoring is required so that the operator does not take advantage of low
maximum levels fixed to maximise profits;
(c) The revenue sharing strategy that takes into account the traffic attained
without fixing minimum or maximum levels of payments. This strategy
does not provide any guaranteed payments to the port authority but is very
effective to both the operator and port authority where traffic is high and
growing.
Figure No. 7
Comparative Sources of Lease Income Strategies for Landlord Port Authority
Fixed Sum Strategy Mini-Max Strategy Revenue Sharing
Strategy
The port authority
gives the
concessionaire the
right to operate the
facilities for a fixed
sum.
The port authority grants
a concession in return
for a variable fee. This
has a floor and a ceiling
related to the level of
annual traffic.
The port authority
imposes no ceiling
on the fee payable by
the concessionaire
although there is a
floor.
If traffic estimates
are too low, the port
authority subsidises
the concessionaire
The port authority may
subsidise the
concessionaire but
only when traffic
exceeds the envisaged
ceiling
This allows the port
authority to maximise
its profits,
employment and
traffic without
subsidising the
concessionaire
85
The Landlord port authority has other sources of revenue besides from concessions
and lease fees. Potential sources are listed in Appendix 8.
5.6 Conclusion
THA has decided to adopt different privatisation strategies suitable to each of the
business units to be operated as cost/profit centres. Privatisation of the operational
activities will lead to THA to be transformed into a landlord port authority and also
perform the regulatory functions. As landlord port authority THA will concession
and lease out the commercial activities to the private sector. Privatisation is expected
to improve the operational performance of the ports and contribute positively on the
government budget. The major negative impact of privatisation has been identified to
be the massive loss of jobs. However it is expected that in the long run privatisation
will contribute towards increased creation of jobs and thus alleviate the current
shortages.
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CHAPTER SIX
6. Recommendations and Conclusions
6.1 Gradual Move Towards Privatisation
The privatisation of THA is long and complex hence there is need for a “phased
approach” in the implementing it. First THA has to undergo commercialisation
aimed at introducing commercial viability criteria in business operations.  This will
create an enabling environment for effective private sector participation.
Commercialisation should go hand in hand with deregulation and liberalisation
measures in order to create an attractive and competitive market environment that is
open to private sector operators and investors. Implementation of these reform
measures prepares the ground for privatisation of the operational activities of the
port.
6.2 Creation of Business Units
Serious efforts towards private sector participation commenced upon the
commissioning of the all-important “Commercialisation Study” in 1996 followed by
the “Tanzania Port Privatisation Review study” in 1997. A major recommendation of
the two consultant reports on privatisation of THA is the pursuance of the Business
Units concept towards the transformation to landlord port status. The basic idea was
to split up the port activities into small units, which would operate on the basis of
cost/profit, centres. The created business units would have to develop their own
organisational structures suited to the needs of their own market sector and the
personalities of the people running them. This makes the business units more aware
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of what their costs and revenues are, and of the actions they need to take to service
their customers more effectively. THA has to also decentralise the operations of the
three major ports of Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara. This will give the ports more
autonomy in making their own decisions particularly on issues related to
investments, tariff setting, manpower requirements, etc. The Headquarters needs
restructuring in line with the new roles and functions after privatisation.
6.3 Improving the Business Environment
There are issues that may limit the realisation of the privatisation objectives.
Understanding changes and their implications on port performance and development
is but a necessity for a successful privatisation. Thus as privatisation gains
momentum, THA should be aware of the global trends and their impact on the port.
Ports and international transport in general are being viewed as part of the production
process. A liberalised economy creates an attractive environment to integrate the
local economy to that of the rest of the world. This creates opportunities to producers
and investors as a result of the enlarged resource base and market. Current trends in
shipping show that bigger ships, especially container and bulk carriers are now
dominating the international shipping market thereby putting pressure on ports to
make heavy investments for maintaining deep water berths and access channels, and
purchase of appropriate equipment.  This has also influenced the developments of
Hub/Pendulum and transhipment ports in the Indian Ocean at Salalah, Aden,
Mauritius, Djibouti and Durban thus intensifying competition in the region.  If this
trend continues most of the East African ports will be relegated into feeder ports.
6.4 Investments and Information Technology
The port authority should continue investing in state of the art facilities. These
should include putting in place a computerised system that will enable the port to
provide accurate real time information for planning and managing terminal
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operations. This can be extended to port users who are updated with real time data
that is so vital for them to effect better logistic management. A business environment
will be enhanced with thorough use of Information Technology. IT development
needs to be done very fast. The application of information technology has very
positive impacts on the ports in relation to documentation, record keeping and
dissemination of information, and decision making. What causes a big change in port
is good and fast communication as has happened to the port of Aarhus in Denmark.
Good communication helps the port to reduce operational delays, improve
documentation, improved cargo clearance procedures thus making the port to be
rated the best customer service provider in Europe.
6.5 Labour
There have been concerns about the negative effects of privatisation particularly with
regard to loss of jobs. However, there are still a virtual absence of policies on
retrenchment and payment of benefits thereof. The government also has yet to
establish social safety nets that will absorb some of the shocks of privatisation, as
there has not been determined efforts to come up with acceptable solutions.
There are proposals that the remaining employees should be casual. It is the author’s
view that this would not be a good solution because of the negative implications
associated with casual labour.  In the long run casualisation of labour-force results in
increased poverty, insecurity and workers getting worn out quickly. It is a problem
on the part of the port authority and the private operator because they cannot be
guaranteed qualified employees as it is very difficult to provide proper training to
casual employees. The port operators would benefit by engaging permanent labour as
they would have royal, committed and properly trained worker. During the
transformation period, THA will however continue to employ many workers
compared to what is happening in other parts because of the local conditions and the
peculiarities listed below:
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(a) Inadequate capital resources;
(b) Cheap and abundant labour resources;
(c) Constraints with regard to automation and computerisation;
(d) Factors such as poor information systems, poor technological base,
unreliable power supply, etc.
6.6 Reforms and Improvements in Sectors Linked to Ports
The port’s competitiveness depends very much on the state of the Railways and
roads for moving cargo from the port to the hinterland and vice-versa. Tanzania is
very much constrained in this area. Inland transport is not only poor but also
inadequate and unreliable making it very difficult for the port to compete effectively
for transit cargoes to the landlocked countries. In recent years competition has very
much intensified making the port lose a substantial share of the market particularly to
the port of Durban in South Africa. Inland transport links are important for a port and
to shippers so as:
(a) To be competitive;
(b) Reduce transit time - getting the goods at the right time and place;
(c) Reduced transport costs (tie in capital - high value cargo very sensitive to
time, insurance costs);
(d) Minimise damage to goods –perishable goods, high value cargo.
The role-played by customs in the port is one of the issues that impact a lot on the
performance of a port. Suffice it to say that cumbersome documentation and customs
clearance procedures contribute a lot to the problems related to high cargo dwell
times and port congestion.  For effective privatisation the way customs conduct their
business in the port needs to be reviewed so that customers do not have to suffer
unnecessarily to have their cargo cleared.
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The port is an important link in the entire transportation chain. A well co-ordinated
transport chain is essential for effective servicing of the economy. Therefore the
privatisation of ports should go hand in hand with improvements in other sectors that
are closely linked to it. In this connection the government should work out a strategy
for the privatisation of TRC, TAZARA, NASACO, the road sector and other players.
6.7 Reform Framework and Strategy
There should be continued efforts in implementing organisational changes already
initiated.  The government has provided the milestone about the future of the port
industry in Tanzania. However, the privatisation process is still lacking a clear policy
backed by an implementation plan. Areas of concern here include the unclear tenure
of office of the PSRC, which raises uncertainty about future management of the
privatisation. It is also not clear on the next step that THA should take to proceed
with the privatisation of the remaining business units after the container terminal.  A
clear reform framework would help planning of the necessary reform actions on a
wider perspective.
6.8 Training – A Continuous Process
Training is an important activity for any organisation.  Training improves culture and
business attitudes of the workers as well as enabling them to acquire new skills and
technologies, create awareness on environmental protection, and importance of
safety. Through training an organisation can improve labour productivity, cost
effectiveness, marketing and overall competitiveness. Training will address THA’s
problems and constraints discussed in chapter two of this study. The port authority
should work towards adaptation of a modern corporate culture commencing with the
reorientation of key personnel through exposure to the business environment,
reinforced by attitudinal retraining of the general staff, with emphasis on the
implementation of higher standards of managerial and front desk service quality. By
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giving human resource appropriate training in technology and operational systems,
the port will be in a better position to adapt and become better prepared for
new/modern developments.
6.9 Performance Standards
Performance standards should be set to achieve self-determined targets and those
agreed with our principals and customers. These should be annual performance
targets and performance contract targets that have been agreed with the government
and the East African Conference Lines of which performance thresholds have been
agreed on for container handling. The port authority should constantly review
performance of private operators. The private operators should thus furnish to the
authority information necessary for monitoring performance and conducting annual
reviews. In order for the port authority to perform its monitoring and co-ordination
functions, private operators be required to provide report and information on the
activities and operations of privatised facilities on a regular basis or as may be
determined by the port authority. Basic information and reports should include:
(a) Cargo throughput (Quantity and types of cargo handled);
(b) Shipping traffic (number and types of ships, railcars, or trucks loaded or
unloaded);
(c) Availability and use of major equipment such as Gantry Cranes, Reach
Stackers, Front-end loaders, etc.
Provision of such information should be by use of appropriate information systems
available especially EDI.
6.10 Marketing Strategy
For improved efficiency and competitiveness, there is need for the port community to
promote and develop the privatised facilities to achieve its maximum utilisation. The
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benchmark for all marketing is to ensure that there is no significant decline in service
standards. Port marketing and market dominance based on the establishment of a
more competitive pricing strategy should be improved. The strategy of establishing
autonomous business units should be followed by extensive micro accounting of cost
and revenue centres that should be instituted and integrated with the expansion of
computer aided financial control system. Objective analysis of cost and revenue data
for all business units would lead to the optimisation of future services mix.
6.11 Land Requirements
This is the ultimate goal for THA after privatisation. The foundation for any landlord
port is the availability of adequate and suitable land that is to be developed or availed
to the private sector for industrial development. This will help put logistic or
distribution centres, off dock activities, etc. The authority should continue efforts to
acquire land as per the powers conferred upon it by Government notice No. 54 of
1994 on port harbour limits and peri-harbour limits.  At the present time, the
authority has abundant land in Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara and the Act invests
powers on the authority to formally acquire and develop for future use. Currently
there is a talk about establishing Free Port and Export Processing zones. This idea
should be developed further in line with land requirements and implemented without
further delay.
6.12 Commercialisation/Privatisation Initiatives in Progress
There is need to maintain the momentum of the privatisation process. It should be
noted that the privatisation programme under the PSRC has put to a halt, at least
temporarily, the privatisation initiatives, which were in progress then. The
privatisation momentum could not be maintained in the following areas:
(a) The joint venture initiative between THA and NECTAR for the Bulk
Handling Terminal;
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(b) Privatisation of the passenger terminal and the lighterage quay on the basis
of the master plan prepared by Coode Blizzard in1996. The master plan
offered opportunity to involve the private sector in all or part of the
redevelopment process on a Build operate Transfer (BOT) basis;
(c) Commercialisation of Tanga port based on a draft strategic business
framework prepared under the ODA funded technical assistance
programme;
(d) Leasing of the Belbase area (Berth 1).
6.13 Common User Facilities
All privatised terminals and facilities should as far as possible, be leased out and
operate as common user terminals or facilities open to any and all shippers,
consignees of cargo and to all shipping lines.
6.14 Limitations on Use of Privatised Facilities
Privatised facilities should be used as per their intended purposes and objectives.
There is need therefore to limit the use of the facilities granted to private operators
within the contract agreement and that any alteration should be the responsibility of
the port authority. This means that the lessee shall use the facilities and equipment in
accordance with the lease agreement and shall not alter, store, move, and provide
logistic services for no other purpose without the prior written approval of the port
authority (Landlord).
6.15 Conclusion
Based on the discussion and analysis made with regard to the privatisation of THA,
private sector participation will take different forms. The most relevant ones are sale
of assets, concessions and joint ventures. Whatever methods are adopted, the
realisation of the goals of the programme rests on effective management of the
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privatisation process and the privatised enterprises. In this regard, a fully developed,
supportive and mature enabling environment characterised by a well-developed
capital market, investment codes, a flexible labour market, and adequate
infrastructure facilities, effective managerial practices are crucial to the attainment of
privatisation goals.
With the short-term negative consequences of a privatisation programme such as
unemployment due to retrenchment, management of privatised enterprises and
restructured state-owned enterprises need to be socially responsive in not only
mitigating the adverse effects of privatisation, but also responding to the emerging
needs of the society. Achieving economic goals, maintaining competitive advantage,
and being socially responsible simultaneously require innovative managerial
practices. Innovative managerial practices are needed not only to seize the
opportunities but also to face the challenges created by privatisation.
Constraints inhibiting both THA and the private sector in the country, at least during
the transition period, call for formation of a public/private sector partnership in the
ownership, management and operation of ports’ activities as a means to sharing risks,
investments and profits.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
PORT PROFILES
The Port of Dar es Salaam
The port of Dar es Salaam is Tanzania’s principal port. The port has a total quay
length of about 2,000 metres with the following facilities:-
(a) Container Terminal
The Container Terminal has three deep-water berths with a quay length of 540
metres is equipped with three Ship to Shore Gantry Cranes (SSG) – each having a
capacity of 35.6 ton. Six Rubber Tyred Gantry Cranes (RTG) for stacking containers
in the yard. Loading and unloading of wagons is carried out by a 35.6 ton Rail
Mounted Gantry Crane (RMG) which is positioned at the conversion of the two
railway lines (Tanzania Railways and Tanzania Zambia Railways) serving the port.
Back up facilities for the Container Terminal include an Inland Container Depot
located about 2 kilometres outside the port. In addition the terminal is equipped with
adequate compliment of transfer equipment. The terminal rated capacity is 120,000
TEUs per annum. In 1996 the Terminal handled 98,906 TEUs.
(b) General Cargo Terminal
The re-paved General Cargo Terminal has eight deep-water berths to cater for Dry
Break-Bulk Cargo. It has eight sheds with a total floor area of 81,040 square meters
in the port. The Terminal has an annual capacity of 2.5 million tons. It is equipped
with 28 Portal Cranes (5-7 ton capacity), 27-Yard Cranes (3-5 ton capacity), 119
forklift trucks (2.5 – 3.5 ton capacity), and 44 tractors and 86 trailers.
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(c) Grain Terminal
The Grain Terminal has a fully automated silo for handling import and export grains.
Discharge is by a grab/hoppers system including three bagging units. Grain is
transferred from the quay by 10 dump tractors. The silo is aerated and temperature
controlled and has a holding capacity of 30,000 tons.  Fumigation facilities are also
available to protect the grains against damage by moulds or insects.
(d) Oil Terminals
The Single Point Mooring (SPM) is an off shore berth for tankers to moor and
discharge crude oil for refineries in Dar es Salaam and Ndola in Zambia. The buoy
can accommodate tankers of up to 100,000 DWT and can handle 5,000 tons per hour.
The draught at the buoy is thirty metres. White products are handled at the Kurasini
Oil Jetty (KOJ) which has capacity to handle tankers of up to 45,000 (DWT).
(e) Passenger Facilities
Passengers from Coastal Vessels embark and/or disembark at Malindi Wharf.
General Cargo Terminals also handles Cruise Vessels, as the port has no dedicated
terminal for cruise vessels yet.
(f) Cargo Centres Owned by User Countries
Some user countries have their own cargo centres located near the port to facilitate
cargo consolidation. Notable ones are the ZAMCARGO and Malawi Cargo Centre
(MCCL). ZAMCARGO is a Zambian owned clearing and forwarding company that
has specialised in clearing cargoes from Zambia. The company has its own yard near
the port for both export and import consolidation. The yard has a Tanzania Zambia
Railway Authority (TAZARA) railway siding. The company owns a fleet of tractors
and trailers for transfer of cargo to and from the port.
The Malawi Government has established dedicated cargo facilities in Dar es Salaam
and Mbeya (some 750 kilometres from the port) to speed up transit traffic to and
from Malawi).  Facilities available include a warehouse, container handling yard
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with a 35 tonnes Gantry Crane and a rail siding. MCCL has also a 12,000 cubic
metre diesel tank, 7,700 cubic metre petrol tank and rail siding at the tank farm.
There are 22 tank wagons, which move fuel between Dar es Salaam and Mbeya on
TAZARA. At Mbeya, Malawi Cargo Centre operates a depot with the following
facilities: 35 tonnes gantry crane, a warehouse, 2,500 cubic metres tank farm and rail
siding.
(g) Link to the Hinterland
Dar es Salaam port is linked to its hinterland by two railway systems, the Tanzania
Railways Corporation (TRC) and Tanzania Zambia railways Authority (TAZARA).
The TRC Line is 1,255 kilometres long. It goes up to the shores of Lake Tanganyika
linking Dar es Salaam port not only with Western Tanzania but also with Bukavu in
Zaire and Burundi. The line branches at Tabora and goes to Mwanza on Lake
Victoria to link the port with Uganda and Western Kenya. Before reaching Mwanza,
at Isaka TRC has built a modern depot to facilitate transhipment of cargoes to
Kigali in Rwanda some 500 kilometres from Isaka. Both Tanzania Railways
Corporation and Uganda Railways Corporation (URC) operate rail wagon ferries
across Lake Victoria. The ferries connect Mwanza with Port Bell in Uganda. At
Ruvu, some 60 kilometres from Dar es Salaam the line branches to Tanga where it
stretches further to Moshi and Arusha in Tanzania and Taveta in Kenya where it
connects to the Kenyan railways System.
The Port of Tanga
The port of Tanga which is the second in size has the following facilities:
(a) Two lighterage wharves with a total length of 381 metres and nine (9)
handling points.
(b) Nine (9) transit sheds with a total flow area of 21,913m2
(c) Stacking grounds area of 11,334 m2
(d) One fertiliser jetty
The port of Tanga is rated to handle 500,000 tonnes of general cargo per annum.
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Mtwara Port
The port of Mtwara  (the third in size) has rated capacity to handle 400,000 tonnes of
general cargo and has the following facilities: -
(a) Two- (2) natural deep water berths with total length of 380 metres.
(b) Four (4)  transit sheds with total floor area of 16, 723 m2
(c) Stacking ground of 13, 000 m2.
Small Ports
(a) Lindi
One (1) dhow jetty, three (3) transit sheds with floor area of 150m2
(b) Kilwa Masoko
One (1) dhow jetty, one (19 transit shed with total floor area 0f 297 m2
(c) Mafia
One jetty
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Appendix 2
The Increasing Size of the Container Ship
Date Generation No. of
TEUs
Speed Length (metres)
1960 – 1970 1st generation Less than 1,000 16 180
1970 – 1980 2nd generation 2.000 23 215
1985 3rd generation 3,000 – 4,000 23 260 – 280
1988 4th generation 4,000 – 5,000 23 275 – 305
1995 5th generation 6,000 + 310 – 42.8b 14m draft
6th generation 8,000 + 23 338 46b 13mdraft
6th generation see Lloyd’s list July 1998 on proposed new Maersk tonnage.
In 1998 there were some 36 container ships with drafts greater than 14 metres.
Ship size No of  tiers under
deck
No of tiers on
deck
No of rows across
deck
2,000  TEUs 7 4 13
3,000  TEUs 7/8 4/5 13
4,000  TEUs 8/9 5/6 13
5,000  TEUs 9 576 16
6,000  TEUs 9 5/6/7 17
15,000  TEUs* 10/11 6/7 28
*Hypothetical vessel.             Source R. G Mclellan
Source: Alderton P. An analysis of changes concerning ports and shipping.
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Appendix 3
Number of Parastatals Divested or Restructured 1993 – 1997
Mode Of
Divestiture
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total Transport Shipping
Sale of
Shares/assets
5 18 11 24 25 83
Liquidation 0 16 17 9 11 53 1
Closure 4 5 1 3 1 14 1
Lease 2 8 5 7 1 24
Performance
contract
0 1 2 0 2 5 2 1
Total 11 48 36 43 40 178 3 2
Placed under
LART
0 11 9 0 0 20
Total
excluding
LART
11 37 27 43 40 158 3 2
Source: PSRC, 1996/97 Review, pp13
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Appendix 4
PARASTATAL SECTOR REFORM COMMISSION
BIDS EVALUATION CRITERIA
SCOREBIDDER
PARAMETER A B C D E
1. INVESTMENT PROGRAMME
2. FINANCING PLAN
- EQUITY
- LOAN
3. SALES PROJECTIONS
4. REVENUE TO GOVERNMENT
- CORPORATIONTAX
- SALES TAX
- EXCISE TAX
- DIVIDENDS (IF J.V)
5. MARKETING PLAN
- EXPORTS
- DOMESTIC
6. EMPLOYMENT RETENTION
AND GENERATION
7. INTRODUCTION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES
8. MANAGEMENT AND STAFF
DEVELOPMENT
9. BALANCE OF PAYMENT
IMPACT
10. PRICE OFFERED
PSRC JANUARY, 1996
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BIDS EVALUATION CRITEIA
Bid evaluation criteria for the divestiture of a commercial parastatal would typically
consider the following criteria:
(a) Proposed investment programme
(b) Proposed financial plan apportioning:
• Equity; and
• Loan
(c) Proposed marketing plan considering.
• Export
• Domestic sales
(d) Projected sales and revenue figures
(e) Likely flow of funds to the government in terms of:
• Corporation tax
• Sales tax
• Excise tax
• Dividends (where joint ventures are involved)
(f) Likely employment retention and /or generation
(g) Proposed management and staff development plans
(h) Likely balance of payments impact on the economy
(i) Magnitude and structure of divestiture consideration (price and
modalities of payments)
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Appendix 5
Comparative Analysis of Involvement of the Private Sector in the Ownership and
Provision of Port and Related Services
Type of ownership and service %
Activity Private Independent
body
Local Port
authority
Government
department
Service to ships
Channels, break waters docks etc 4 4 72 20
Aids to navigation-VTS 0 16 72 12
Pilotage 12 28 52 8
Tugs and Boatmen 32 0 52 16
Stores and bunkering 84 0 8 8
Repairs 40 12 28 20
Cargo and passengers
Terminals 16 12 68 4
Tank farms 44 16 28 12
Cranes 28 0 64 8
Cargo handling 44 0 48 8
Lighterage 32 8 44 16
Land carriers
Roads 8 8 64 20
Lorry and car parks 36 8 40 16
Railway trucks and depots 0 40 36 24
Inland waterways (within port) 0 8 66 26
pipelines 44 16 24 16
General services
Conservancy 0 8 52 40
Lighting 0 16 74 10
Fire fighting 0 24 60 16
Police force 0 28 48 24
Labour amenities 0 40 48 12
sanitation 4 24 60 12
Source: Alderton, P. An analysis of changes concerning ports and shipping.
The data was taken from ports in Europe, ASIA, Africa North America and South
America. As the sample was small and respondents may not always have been
certain on the categorisation of the different activities that best fits their port, the
survey only provides a general indication. However, the table does illustrate the
complex network of activities that make a port and that they can co-exist within a
port whatever the type of ownership, be it private, state, or municipal.
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Appendix 6
General Trends in Numbers Employed in Cargo Handling in Port or
Country
Year London UK Antwerp New
York
Rotterdam Cochin Singapore
1890 100,000
1900 76,500
1910 60,000
1920 52,000 127,000
1930 39,000 111,000
1939 29,000 100,000
1950 22,237 75,265
1960 23,484 72,550 31,000
1970 13,280 46,912 15,000 19,500 12,000 3,100 3,000
1980 4,429 22,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 800 1,000
1990 10,000 8,130
Source: Alderton, P. An analysis of change concerning ports and shipping.
The above table shows a steady decrease in the labour force over the years at
virtually all ports even though cargo throughput has been rising steadily. The figures
shown before 1970 shows that this decrease due to technological change and more
efficient operational practices didn’t just start with containerisation but has been
steady on going process.
Appendix 7
Consultants’ Recommended Privatisation Options for Business Units.
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 Business unit Kienbaum Report Sheila Report THA Recommendations
THA
Headquarters
Restructure setup Restructure in relation to
THA’s new requirement to be
addresses under privatisation
strategy.
Restructure taking into
account
• Transition period
• Landlord status
Container
Terminal
Management
Contract
The Terminal be concessioned
to a single, private operator
Terminal be concessioned to
a private operator for a
period of 10 years.
General
Cargo
Commercial
operation under
THA management
Berth 1 - 4 to be concessioned
as two separate terminals.
Berth 1 - 2 which are in need
of development be offered on
the basis of a ten years
concession.  Berth3 - 4 be
offered for a five years period.
Berth 5 - 8 to be made
available to any properly
private company wishing to
undertake stevedoring and/or
shore side cargo handling
operations.
Berths 7 – 8 be leased for a
shorter term (3 years
contracts) to allow for future
expansion of Container
Terminal.
Berths 4 – 6 be concessioned
as one unit (for 10 years).
Berth 1 – 3 which are in need
of development be offered on
the basis of a 20-year
concession.
Stevedoring Privatise under
license (free market
entry to suitably
qualified firms).
Shed operations to
remain a THA
function
Treated under general cargo Be part of General Cargo
terminals.
Dry Bulk
Handling
Joint venture The agreement to establish a
Joint Venture with a M/S
NECTAR Shipping and
Project LTD. for operation of
the Grain Terminal be
reviewed by an independent
Financial Expert to ascertain
whether it is in THA’s best
interest and consistent with its
long term position as a
landlord port
Arrangements to establish a
Joint Venture with a M/S
Nectar Shipping and Project
Ltd. for operation of the
Grain Terminal be reviewed
by an independent Financial
Expert to ascertain whether it
is in THA’s best interest and
consistent with its long term
position as a landlord port.
Liquid Bulk
Handling
Commercial
operation under
THA management
Kurasini Oil Jetty and the
Single Mooring Point (SBM)
should continue to be operated
by THA.  More efforts should
be made to involve oil
companies in their
management and development.
Oil Terminals be leased as
two units.  KOJ be leased to
a terminal operator for 3
years period. SBM be
concessioned for a longer
period to allow the operator
to replace the pipeline.
Marine Commercial Franchising of a single private Marine Services be leased to
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 Business unit Kienbaum Report Sheila Report THA Recommendations
Services operation under
THA management.
Transfer regulatory
functions to
Ministry of
Transport or other
national body
outside of THA.
operator for an initial period of
five years with transfer of the
existing equipment.
a private operator on vessel
management contract and
franchise agreement for a
period of 5 years.
Dockyard Privatise via the
leasing of assets
Be transferred to the franchise,
leased or sold
Be concessioned as a unit for
a period of 20 years
Real Estate
Management
Operate as THA
profit centre under
Secretary & Legal
department
Core Assets:        Retain with
THA
Housing:             Conduct
further study
Commercial property: Dispose
THA house in Tanga
Core land and assets :Retain
within THA
Residential Housing :Further
study be conducted
Commercial Property: Retain
under landlord.
111
 Business unit Kienbaum Report Sheila Report THA Recommendations
Tanga Establish as
autonomous unit of
THA, with
privatization of
Stevedoring.
Operate as autonomous
Business unit under THA
concessioned to Be a private
operator for a period of 20
years. The Port and the
Fertiliser Jetty be issued as
two separate units
Mtwara Establish as
autonomous unit of
THA, with
privatisation of
Stevedoring.
Operate as autonomous
Business unit under THA
Port be concessioned as one
unit to a private operator for
a period of 15 years
Bandari
College
Close, and
investigate
alternative uses for
premises.
Be leased out to operator on
understanding that a certain
portion of its training capacity
would be assigned to THA
Be leased out to operators on
the understanding that a
certain portion of its training
capacity would be assigned
to THA.
Passenger
Terminal and
Lighter quay
Lease to a private
operating company
The opportunity for
redeveloping all or part of the
area under Build-Operate -
Transfer (BOT) be
investigated.
The unit is concessioned to a
private developer on Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT)
arrangement for 15 years
period.
Security, Fire
& Safety units
Transfer
responsibility to
individual business
units, and partly
contract out.
Part of HQ services
Be considered as part of
landlord structure
Small Ports Not covered by the
study
Conduct further study Remain under the Landlord
with the view of transferring
to local authorities.
Source: THA Corporate strategic Plan 1997.
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Appendix 8
Comparative Sources of Revenue and Expenditure between Landlord and Service Port
Revenues for Rotterdam 1990 Revenues for Singapore
Port dues 62 % Container handling 54.0 %
Rental income 33 % Cargo handling 10.0 %
Other 5   % Marine services 12.3 %
Total 100 % Commercial services 11.7 %
Sundry services 12.0 %
Total 100.0 %
Source of expenditure for Rotterdam 1990 Source of Expenditure for Singapore 1990
Personnel 13.65 % Authority 89.4 %
Port maintenance 10.0 % Subsidiaries 11.6 %
Other maintenance 10.1 % Total 100.0 %
Depreciation 29.2 %
Interest 33.8 %
Other 3.3 %
Total 100.0  %
Source: Alderton, P. An analysis of change concerning ports and shipping.
